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PROPOSING A UNIFORM REMEDIAL
APPROACH FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
CraigRobert Senn*
Given the recent influxes of undocumented workers who have entered the
United States in order to obtain employment, the issue of their remedial
rights under federal employment discrimination law has become highly
significant. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct (ADA), and/or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), these remedies could include back pay, front pay (in lieu of
reinstatement), compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidated
damages, and/or reasonable attorneys 'fees, as applicable.
At present, there is no uniform judicial approach for determining the
monetary remedial rights of the millions of undocumented workers under
these laws. Instead, courts have developed remedial approaches that span
the spectrum in terms of scope. At one end is an approach thatforecloses
none of these remedies. In the middle is an approach thatforecloses only
some of these remedies. At the other end is an approach thatforecloses all
of these remedies.
This Article proposes a "Conditional Foreclosure Approach " as the
uniform approachfor ascertaining the remedial rights of undocumented
workers who pursuefederal discrimination and/or retaliation claims. This
new approach has two distinctfeatures: (1) a "disqualifying condition, "
which provides that an undocumented worker must have violated the
employee-specific provisions (prohibiting fraudulent conduct in the
employment and hiringprocesses) of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) as a condition to any potential remedy foreclosure; and (2)
"limited remedy foreclosure," which forecloses an undocumented worker
from, at most, the monetary remedies of back pay and front pay, while
preserving all other remedies (such as compensatory damages, punitive
damages, liquidateddamages, and reasonable attorneys'fees).
This new approach represents a balanced "middle ground" that draws
from the many relevant sources on this issue, including: the IRCA and its
congressional philosophy and legislative history, U.S. Supreme Court
* Assistant Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law; J.D., with Honors, The University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995; B.A., Summa Cum Laude, The University of
Georgia, 1992. The author's e-mail address is csenn@charlestonlaw.edu.
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precedent under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); federal
employment discriminationpolicy and purpose; and federal immigration
policy and purpose. This new approach properly promotes both federal
employment discriminationpolicy andfederal immigration policy (without
sacrificing either) and adequately holds accountable both employers and
undocumented workersfor unlawful conduct under the IRCA and/orfederal
employment discriminationlaw.
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INTRODUCTION

[E]very remedy extended to undocumented workers under the federal
labor laws provides a marginal incentive for those workers to come to the
United States. It is just as true, however, that every remedy denied to
undocumented workers provides a marginal incentive for employers to
hire those workers ....
Given this tension, the courts must attempt to
sensibly balance competing considerations.I

You are a federal judge. On the docket is the case of an undocumented
worker 2-previously employed by a company in the United States-who
has brought a federal employment discrimination or retaliation claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 3 the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),4 and/or the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 5

As part of her lawsuit, the

undocumented worker has sought the buffet of monetary remedies that are

typically available under the applicable statute(s). Depending upon the
claim(s), these monetary remedies may include: (i) recovery of back pay to
compensate her for past lost wages (from the date of discrimination until
the date of judgment); (ii) recovery of front pay to compensate her for
future lost wages (from the date of judgment until the date of any

reinstatement); (iii) recovery of compensatory damages for any humiliation,
pain and suffering, medical expenses, and other incurred out-of-pocket
costs; (iv) recovery of punitive damages or liquidated damages against her
former employer for any alleged malicious, recklessly indifferent, or
1. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(emphasis added).
2. This Article uses the term "undocumented worker(s)" in lieu of other comparable
terms, such as "unauthorized migrant(s)," see infra note 12, "unauthorized alien(s)," see
infra Part IA, or "undocumented alien(s)" or "illegal alien(s)," see infra notes 116-48 and
accompanying text. While each of these terms reflect a person's immigration-related status,
the "undocumented worker" term is the only one that also reflects employment-related
status-the focus of this Article.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Title VII is the primary piece of federal
employment legislation. It prohibits employment-based discrimination against any person
because of his or her race, color, religion, sex (gender), or national origin. See id. § 2000e2(a)(1). Title VII also prohibits retaliatory discrimination against a person for having
"opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice" or having "made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing"
under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
4. Id. §§ 12101-12213. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits
employment-based discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability" because
of that "disability." See id. § 12112(a)-(b); see also id. §§ 12102(2) (defining "disability"),
12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"). The ADA also contains an
antireta'iation provision similar to that of Title VII. See id. § 12203(a); supra note 3
(describing Title VII's antiretaliation provision).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) prohibits employment-based discrimination against a person because of his or her
age (i.e., forty years old or older). See id. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (limiting the ADEA's
applicability to persons "at least [forty] years of age"). The ADEA also contains an
antiretaliation provision similar to those of Title VII and the ADA. See id. § 623(d); supra
notes 3-4 (describing Title VII's and the ADA's antiretaliation provisions, respectively).
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willfully unlawful conduct; and/or (v) recovery of reasonable attorneys'
6
fees and costs in litigating the claim(s).
You must decide whether the undocumented worker is entitled to all,
some, or none of the available monetary remedies for her claim(s). This
issue lies at the crossroads of two avenues. The first avenue is federal
employment discrimination law and policy-embodied in Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA, all of which seek to hold employers accountable for
unlawful discriminatory and/or retaliatory conduct and to deter such
conduct in the future. 7 The second avenue is federal immigration law and
policy--embodied in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA), 8 which seeks to deter illegal immigration by imposing sanctions
against both employers and undocumented workers for specified unlawful
conduct in the employment and hiring processes. 9
What is your decision? Does federal employment discrimination law and
policy require that the undocumented worker be entitled to recover all of the
available monetary remedies, notwithstanding federal immigration law and
policy? Or, does federal immigration law and policy mandate that the
worker be entitled to recover none of the available monetary remedies,
notwithstanding federal employment discrimination law and policy? Or, do
federal employment and immigration laws and policies together dictate that
the undocumented worker be entitled to recover some, but not all, of the
available monetary remedies, and, if so, which remedies are recoverable
and which are not?

The issue of the remedial rights of undocumented workers under the
federal employment discrimination laws has become particularly significant
in the United States. As one commentator has noted, the American
workplace represents "the most important place where civil rights have met
with immigration law in the United States today,"' 10 given the recent
influxes of undocumented workers who have entered this country for the
purpose of obtaining employment.'I For example, in June 1989, there were

6. See infra Part II.A. While some relevant authorities use the one-worded terms of

"backpay" and "frontpay," others use the two-worded terms of "back pay" and "front pay."
For consistency and uniformity purposes, this Article uses- the two-worded terms.
7. See infra Part II.A.

8. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. Maria Pab6n L6pez, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Civil Rights Law:
Noncitizen Workers and the InternationalHuman Rights Paradigm,44 BRANDEIS L.J. 611,

616 (2006).
11. See id.
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12
approximately 2.5 million undocumented workers in the United States;

however, that figure has virtually quintupled in less than twenty years, to at
least twelve million undocumented workers as recently as 2006.13 In
addition, the average annual increase in the undocumented worker
population in the United States has dramatically expanded from 180,000 per
year during the 1980s, to 400,000 per year during 1990-1994, to 575,000
per year during 1995-1999, and to 850,000 per year during 2000-2004.14
Struggling with how best to balance the federal employment
discrimination laws and federal immigration law, courts have developed
remedial approaches that are inconsistent. Depending upon the jurisdiction,
circuit, or district, an undocumented worker's remedial rights under federal
employment discrimination law range from recovery of all of the available
monetary remedies, to only some of those remedies, to none of those
remedies. 15 In short, at present, there is no uniform remedial approach for
undocumented workers under federal employment discrimination law.
Part I of this Article discusses both congressional and U.S. Supreme
Court guidance regarding undocumented workers and their remedial rights
in the employment context. This part first describes the IRCA, which was
passed by Congress in 1986 and regulated-for the first time under federal
immigration law-the employment of undocumented workers in the United
States. 16 This part then discusses the 1984 and 2002 Supreme Court
decisions 17 that addressed whether undocumented workers were barred
from certain remedies under an employment-related federal statute known
18
as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

12. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION INTHE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005

available
at
(2006),
SURVEY
3
POPULATION
CURRENT
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf [hereinafter PEW UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION REPORT] (using data from Figure 2). This report defines "unauthorized
migrant" as "a person who resides in the United States, but who is not a U.S. citizen, has not
been admitted for permanent residence, and is not in a set of specific authorized temporary
statuses permitting longer-term residence and work." Id. at 1.
13. Id. at 2 ("Data from the monthly Current Population Surveys conducted since March
2005, as well as other evidence such as the number of apprehensions by the Border Patrol,
indicate that the unauthorized flow is continuing. Assuming that the rate of growth evident
between Census 2000 and the March 2005 [Current Population Survey] held steady, the best
estimate for March 2006 is between 11.5 million and 12 million for the current number of
unauthorized migrants.").
14. Id. at 2-3 (using data from Figure 1). In light of this data, the Pew Unauthorized
Migrant Population Report noted that "about two-thirds of unauthorized migrants have been
in the country less than 10 years." Id. at 2.
15. See infra Part II.B-D.
16. See infra Part L.A (providing a detailed discussion of the IRCA).
17. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902-04 (1984); Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002); see also infra Part I.B (discussing
the Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic decisions).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates
certain employee rights regarding labor union organizing, collective bargaining, and
engaging in "concerted activities." Id. § 157 (establishing so-called "section 7" rights to selforganize, form or join a labor union, bargain collectively, or engage in "other concerted
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Part II then identifies three distinct remedial approaches that the courts
have applied to undocumented worker claims under the federal employment
discrimination laws. Each of these approaches has a different remedial
impact upon undocumented workers: the first remedial approach does not
foreclose any monetary remedies under these laws; the second approach
forecloses only certain monetary remedies; and the third remedial approach
forecloses all monetary remedies.
Part III then proposes, discusses, and defends a uniform approach-the
"Conditional Foreclosure Approach"-for determining the monetary
remedial rights of undocumented workers under the federal employment
discrimination laws. This unique remedial approach contains two concrete
features:
(1) "Disqualifying Condition." As a condition to the limited
remedy foreclosure described in (2)(a), the undocumented worker
must have violated the IRCA's employee-specific provisions that
prohibit fraudulent conduct in the employment and hiring
processes, with the employer thus having satisfied the IRCA's
employer-specific requirements as to these processes; and
(2) "Limited Remedy Foreclosure." Under the federal employment
discrimination laws, an undocumented worker:
(a) is foreclosed from (and does not retain) the monetary
remedial rights to back pay and front pay; but
(b) is not foreclosed from (and does retain) all other monetary
remedial rights, including, but not limited to, rights to
compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidated damages,
and reasonable attorneys' fees.
Unlike the three remedial approaches currently embraced by the courts,
the Conditional Foreclosure Approach represents an effective fusion of (i)
the IRCA and its underlying congressional philosophy, (ii) the Supreme
Court's NLRA precedent, and (iii) the policies and purposes of both federal
employment discrimination law and federal immigration law.

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection"). It
prohibits an employer from engaging in "unfair labor practice[s]" by (i) interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees who exercise these rights, (ii) interfering with the
formation or administration of a labor union, (iii) discouraging labor union membership
through discrimination in employment, (iv) retaliating against an employee for filing an
unfair labor practice charge or giving testimony in proceedings under the NLRA, or (v)

refusing to engage in the collective bargaining process with an appropriate labor union. Id. §
158(a)(1)-(5) (commonly referred to as section 8(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(5)
violations).
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I. CONGRESSIONAL AND SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE REGARDING
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND THEIR REMEDIAL RIGHTS

At present, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has addressed the
precise issue of the monetary remedial rights of undocumented workers
under the federal employment discrimination laws. Nonetheless, both the
IRCA and a pair of Supreme Court decisions under the NLRA reflect

important principles and policies that are relevant to determining the
remedial rights of undocumented workers under Title VII, the ADA, and
the ADEA.
A. The Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986
For over thirty years prior to 1986, federal immigration law-embodied
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)1 9-essentially
addressed only "the terms and conditions of admission to the country and
the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country."'20 In addition to

specifying the admission qualifications for "aliens" (including necessary
entry documents and visas in addition to registration requirements), 2' the
INA made it unlawful for any person to "bring to the United States,"
"transport or move," "conceal[], harbor[], or shield[] from detection" any
22
such individual.
While criminalizing these

activities,

Congress had "not

adopted

provisions in the INA making it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien
who is present or working in the United States without appropriate
authorization."2 3 In fact, the INA had originally stated that "employment"
'24
of such a person "shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.
Consequently, the 1NA had originally "evince[d] 'at best ... a peripheral
25
concern with employment of illegal entrants."'

19. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
20. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976); see also Christopher Ho & Jennifer C.
Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategiesfor
ProtectingUndocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 473, 478 (2005) (stating that pre-1986 immigration law "generally concerned only
the terms and conditions under which foreign nationals would be classified and admitted to
this country and, perhaps, become its naturalized citizens"); Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and
Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 955, 979 (stating that pre-1986 "immigration law directly regulated
border and entry only").
21. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1306. The INA defines "alien" as "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States." Id. § 1 101(a)(3).
22. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
23. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-93 (1984).
24. See id. (discussing the INA's since-amended language in 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 51-52 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5655-56 (stating that "employment is specifically
exempted from the penalties for harboring" via the so-called "'Texas proviso').
25. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892 (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360) (emphasis added).
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In 1986, however, Congress filled this void with the IRCA, 26 which
amended the INA. The primary purpose of the IRCA was to "control
illegal immigration into the United States." 27 Importantly, Congress
considered employment in the United States to be the "back door on illegal
immigration" and "the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally." 28 In an
effort to "close [this] back door" 29 and to "diminish the attractive force" of
this magnet, 30 Congress-for the first time ever--created a "comprehensive
scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States"
and "'forcefully' made combating the3 1employment of illegal aliens central
to '[t]he policy of immigration law."
The IRCA's "comprehensive scheme" consists of two key parts: (i) an
"employment verification system" that creates employer-specific
responsibilities when hiring any employee in the United States; 32 and (ii)
the imposition of civil33and/or criminal sanctions against both employers and
"unauthorized aliens" for certain unlawful conduct in these employment
34
and hiring processes.
Under the IRCA's employment verification system, an employer is
required, first, to review certain documents that confirm both the identity
and employment authorization (work eligibility) of any person seeking
employment and, second, to attest (under penalty of perjury) that it has
"verified" the person is "not an unauthorized alien." 35 If the employer

26. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8

U.S.C.).
27. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5649.
28. Id. at 46; see also id. at 52 (stating that "the most reasonable approach to this
problem is to make unlawful the 'knowing' employment of illegal aliens, thereby removing
the economic incentive which draws such aliens to the United States"); id. at 56 (stating that
"as long as job opportunities are available to undocumented aliens, the intense pressure to
surreptitiously enter this country or to violate status once admitted as a nonimmigrant in
order to obtain employment will continue").
29. Id. at 46.
30. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
31. Id. at 147 (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194
n.8 (1991)) (alteration in original).
32. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing this employment
verification system).
33. The IRCA defines "unauthorized alien" as an "alien," see supra note 20 (providing
the INA's definition of "alien"), who is neither "lawfully admitted for permanent residence"
nor "authorized to be... employed" in the United States per the IRCA. 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(h)(3).
34. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (discussing these IRCA prohibitions
for employers and undocumented workers, in addition to applicable civil and/or criminal
sanctions).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1). Under the IRCA, the following documents establish both
identity and employment authorization: (1) a U.S. passport; or (2) a resident alien card or
registration card (subject to certain requirements). Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(B). Otherwise, the
employer must ensure that an individual presents one document establishing identity (for
example, a driver's license) and another establishing employment authorization (for
example, a social security card). Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(C)-(D).
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makes a "good faith attempt" to meet these employment verification system
responsibilities, it is deemed to have complied with the IRCA,
notwithstanding any "technical or procedural failure. '36 In addition, the
person seeking employment must also attest (under penalty of perjury) that
37
he or she is eligible and authorized to work in the United States.
Beyond creating this employment verification system, the IRCA targets
both employers and undocumented workers with sanctions for certain
prohibited conduct in the employment and hiring processes. First, the
IRCA prohibits employers from (i) hiring any person without complying
with the paperwork obligations of the employment verification system 38
and (ii) hiring, or continuing to employ, any person whom the employer
knows "is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such
39
employment.
The IRCA provides the following penalties for these noncompliant
employers:
(i) if an employer violates the employment verification
system's paperwork obligations as to any person, it is subject to civil
fines; 40 (ii) if an employer hires or continues to employ a person whom it
knows to be an "alien," it is subject to even steeper civil fines; 4 1 and (iii) if
an employer engages in a "pattern or practice" of hiring or employing
individuals whom it knows to be "aliens," it is subject to additional criminal
42
fines and/or criminal prosecution and imprisonment for up to six months.
Congress considered these "employer sanctions" to be "the principal means
of closing the back door, or curtailing future immigration" based on a
"trickle-down" rationale: "Employers will be deterred by the penalties in
[the IRCA] from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter
aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in search of
43
employment."
In addition, the IRCA takes a hard-line stance against undocumented
workers who engage in fraudulent conduct in the employment and hiring
When reviewing and determining the authenticity of these documents, an employer
is subject only to a "'reasonable man' standard." H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 62 (1986),
reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5666. Thus, an employer is deemed to have complied
with its document examination duties if an applicable document "reasonably appears on its
face to be genuine." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).

36. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A).
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 1324a(b)(2).
Id. § 1324a(a)(1).
Id. § 1324a(a)(2).
Id. § 1324a(e)(5) (specifying fines ranging from $100 to $1000 for each such

person).

41. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (specifying fines ranging from $250 to $10,000 for each such
"alien").
42. Id. § 1324a(f)(1) (specifying fines up to $3000 for each such individual).
43. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5650 (noting that "the Committee remains convinced that legislation containing employer
sanctions is the most ... effective way to respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented
aliens"); see also id. at 47 (stating that "[s]ince most undocumented aliens enter this country
to find jobs, the Committee believes it is essential to require employers to share the
responsibility to address this serious problem").
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processes. 44 Specifically, the IRCA makes it a federal crime for any person
(i) to use an identification document (as part of the employment verification
system) that he or she knows, or has reason to know, was "not issued
lawfully" to him or her or was otherwise "false" or (ii) to falsely attest (as
part of this system) that he or she is eligible and authorized to work in the
United States. 4 5 The IRCA subjects any person who engages in this
unlawful conduct to a criminal fine and/or criminal prosecution and
imprisonment for a period up to five years. 46 Similarly, a person is
prohibited from, and is subject to civil fines for, using or attempting to use
(as part of the IRCA's employment verification system) (i) any "forge[d],
[made] document" or (ii) any document
counterfeit, alter[ed], or falsely ... 47
"lawfully issued to" another person.
Importantly, however, neither the IRCA nor INA prohibits the
undocumented worker from (or otherwise imposes any civil or criminal
sanctions upon that worker for) the mere act of obtaining employment in
the United States. 48 In other words, an undocumented worker does not
violate the IRCA's employment provisions just because he or she becomes
(or is) employed in this country; instead, that worker is only subject to civil
and/or criminal sanctions if he or she uses the specified fraudulent means in
the employment and hiring processes.
Finally, when enacting the IRCA, Congress briefly commented on
undocumented workers and their status as "employees" under federal labor
law-namely, the NLRA. Two years before the IRCA was enacted, the
Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, in which it concluded, in
part, that undocumented workers were covered "employees" to whom
NLRA rights and protections applied. 49 Discussing whether the IRCA had
any impact on this decision and undocumented workers' protections under
the NLRA, Congress stated that it did not intend the IRCA

44. See id. at 62 (stating that the IRCA provides "serious... penalties" if and when
"fraudulent documents are utilized").
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2000).

46. Id.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (listing prohibited actions); id. § 1324c(d)(3) (specifying fines
ranging from $250 to $5000 for each improper document).
48. See generally id. §§ 1101-1537; Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
893 (1984) (stating that, under the INA, "Congress has not made it a separate criminal
offense for an alien to accept employment after entering this country illegally"); Del Rey
Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1124 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J., dissenting)
("Once an alien has crossed the border, however, employment is not an additional offense (in
fact, it is no crime at all).... This distinction between having to break the law to reach the
workplace and lacking a formal legal entitlement to work is the only reading of Sure-Tan
that makes sense."); Ho & Chang, supra note 20, at 479 (stating that, under the INA,
"although it was unlawful for an immigrant to enter the United States without inspection, it
was not per se unlawful for her to seek and obtain employment here").
49. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 894; see also infra Part I.B.1 (generally discussing the SureTan decision); infra note 75 (discussing Sure-Tan's conclusion that undocumented workers
were covered "employees" under the NLRA).
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to undermine or diminish in any way laborprotections in existing law, or

to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards, labor
standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair practices
committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights
before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing
law. In particular,the employer sanctions provisions are not intended to
limit in any way the scope of the term "employee" in Section 2(3) of the
[NLRA] . . .or of the rights andprotections stated in Sections 7 and 8 of

that Act.

50

Implicitly recognizing that some employers may be encouraged to employ
more undocumented workers if those workers received no protection as
"employees" under the NLRA, Congress reasoned that such a result "would
intent [in the IRCA] to limit the hiring of
be counter-productive of our
5
undocumented employees." '
B. The Supreme Court's NLRA Precedent

Almost thirty years after the passage of the INA and just two years before
the enactment of the IRCA, the Supreme Court-for the first time-tackled
the issue of the remedial rights of undocumented workers under federal
labor and employment law. 52 In its 1984 decision in Sure-Tan, the Court,
relying on the INA, restricted back pay (and reinstatement) remedies for
undocumented workers under the NLRA. 53 Then, in 2002, the Court
addressed virtually the same issue in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB. 5 4 Relying this time on the IRCA, the Court left no doubt that

workers can be foreclosed from back pay remedies under the
undocumented
55
NLRA.
1. Pre-IRCA-The Sure-Tan Decision
Sure-Tan was a leather-processing company in Chicago, and most of its
eleven employees were "Mexican nationals present illegally in the United
States without visas or immigration papers authorizing them to work."'56 In
elected a union to serve as their
1976, a group of seven Sure-Tan employees
57
representative.
collective-bargaining
Within two hours after the election, Sure-Tan's president asked the
employees "whether they had valid immigration papers." 58 Then, after
learning that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had rejected
50. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662 (emphasis added).
pt. 2,at 8-9.
51. Id.,
52. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883.
53. Id.at 902-05.
54. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
55. Id. at 151-52.
56. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 886.
57. Id. at 886-87.
58. Id.
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Sure-Tan's challenges to the election results, its president wrote a letter to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and asked it to "check the
[imm]igration status of several [of its] employees, who [were] Mexican
nationals." 5 9 About a month later, the INS visited Sure-Tan to "investigate
the immigration status of all Spanish-speaking employees"; it found that
'60
five of them were "living and working illegally in the United States."
These employees, who then admitted their "illegal presence in the country,"
61
departed on a bus to Mexico by the end of day.
The NLRB subsequently concluded that Sure-Tan had engaged in unfair
labor practices under the NLRA by, inter alia, requesting the INS
investigation "solely because the employees supported the Union. '6 2 The
NLRB then awarded the NLRA's "conventional remedy of reinstatement
with backpay" 63 for the undocumented workers who had already returned to
64
Mexico.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struggled
with what it called "the most difficult problem presented on this appeal"namely, the "appropriateness of the relief ordered by the Board" for the
undocumented workers. 65 As a general matter, the Seventh Circuit agreed
that the NLRA's "conventional remedy" of "reinstatement and backpay
66
[was] justified" for these workers.
But, in an effort to "reconcil[e]" these remedies with "the policies
underlying the national immigration laws," 67 the court placed "limitations"
on them. 68 As to reinstatement, the Seventh Circuit noted that such relief
was proper "only if the discriminatees are legally present and legally free to
be employed in this country when they offer themselves for
reinstatement. '69 As to back pay, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
59. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1189 (1978).

60. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887.
61. Id.
62. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. at 1187.

63. Id. Section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to order an employer that has committed an unfair labor practice to "take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies" of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (also authorizing the NLRB to

issue cease and desist orders against employers). Unlike the federal employment
discrimination laws, the NLRA does not provide for compensatory, punitive, or liquidated
damages. See id.; infra Part II.A (discussing Title VII, ADA, and ADEA monetary

remedies).
64. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. at 1187-88.
65. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 602 (7th Cir. 1982), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); see also id. at 595 (noting "the further knotty problem of

rectifying the injustice done" to Sure-Tan's undocumented workers).
66. Id. at 604 (reasoning that the purpose of these remedies was to make "employees
whole for their losses caused by the employer's unfair labor practices" and that these
remedies were needed to "vindicate the policy of the [NLRA] and to deter similar conduct
by other employers in the future").
67. Id. at 605.
68. Id. at 604.
69. Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court minimized the impact of this
limitation by stating that reinstatement offers for undocumented workers who are no longer
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undocumented workers would be "deemed unavailable for work"-and thus
not entitled to any back pay relief-for "any period when not lawfully
'70
entitled to be present and employed in the United States.
Significantly, however, the court recognized that this "legal (or lawful)
presence" limitation on back pay would likely preclude these
any monetary relief.71
from receiving
undocumented workers
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit opted to reduce this limitation's adverse
impact by endorsing a "minimum" six-month back pay remedy that "the
employer must pay [to each undocumented worker] in any event."' 72 The
court reasoned that this back pay "minimum" (as opposed to no back pay at
all) would "better effectuate the policies of the [NLRA]" and better
recognize the employer's "discriminatory act which caused these employees
73
to lose their jobs."
The Supreme Court, assessing the "validity" of the NLRB's (and, as
modified, the Seventh Circuit's) "remedial order," 74 reversed and remanded
for "formulation of an appropriate remedial order." 7 5 While the Court

in the country "should remain open for a period of four years to afford [them] a liberal but
reasonable opportunity" to re-enter the country legally and "reclaim their jobs." Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. The NLRB subsequently adopted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit's recommendation as to the six-month minimum back pay award. Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 890 (1984).
74. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 886.
75. Id. at 906. The U.S. Supreme Court decided this remedial issue in Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB by a five to four margin. The five member majority on this issue was comprised of
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Byron White, Lewis F.
Powell, and William H. Rehnquist; the four member minority was comprised of Justices
William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens. See id.
at 886, 906, 913.
In addition to addressing this remedial issue, the Court tackled the "predicate
question" of "whether the NLRA should apply to unfair labor practices committed against
undocumented aliens." Id. at 891. In other words, are "undocumented aliens" covered
"employees" to whom NLRA rights and protections apply?
Deferring to the NLRB's administrative position on this question, the Court-by a
seven to two majority-held that "the provisions of the NLRA are applicable to
undocumented alien employees." Id. at 894. The Court offered several bases for its decision.
First, the Court noted that the NLRA had a "broad statutory definition of 'employee"' and
that Congress did not include "undocumented aliens" among the NLRA's exempted
employee categories. Id. at 891-92; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (containing the
NLRA's definition of "employee").
Second, the Court stated that (i) not applying the NLRA to these workers would
create a "subclass" of workers that had no real stake in the collective representation and
bargaining process, whereas (ii) applying it to these workers would further the NLRA's
purpose of "encouraging and protecting the collective bargaining process." Sure-Tan, 467
U.S. at 892.
Finally, the Court explained that applying the NLRA to undocumented workers did
not "conflict" with any express provision of the INA and was, in fact, "compatible with the
policies of the INA." Id. at 892-93. As to the former, the Court stated that, because the INA
contained no language that "ma[de] it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien," the
NLRA's application to these workers failed to "conflict with the terms of the INA." Id. As
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embraced the Seventh Circuit's application of a "legal (or lawful) presence"
limitation upon back pay and reinstatement remedies for undocumented
workers under the NLRA, 76 it rebuffed any "minimum" back pay remedy
77
for these workers.
As to the former, the Court concretely agreed with the Seventh Circuit
that "the implementation of the [NLRB's] traditional remedies [i.e.,
reinstatement and back pay] ...

must be conditioned upon the employees'

legal readmittance to the United States."' 78 Specifically, the Court noted
that (i) any reinstatement remedy for Sure-Tan's undocumented workers
under the NLRA hinged on their "legal reentry" and (ii) any back pay
remedy for them under the NLRA was to be tolled, and unavailable,
"during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and
employed in the United States."'79 Significantly, the Court reasoned that the
NLRB, in crafting remedies for NLRA violations, must "take into account"
the "'equally important Congressional objectiv[e]' . . . of deterring
unauthorized immigration that is embodied in the INA. ' '80 These "legal
reentry" and "lawful[] . . . presen[ce]" conditions, said the Court, "avoided"
a "potential conflict" between the NLRA's remedial relief and the INA.8 1
As to the latter, however, the Court flatly rejected the Seventh Circuit's
"irreducible minimum of six months' backpay" 82 for undocumented
workers under the NLRA. 83 In support of this decision, the Court offered
two points regarding federal immigration law and policy. 84 First, the Court
to the latter, the Court noted that the INA was designed to "preserve jobs for American
workers" and protect the "wages and working conditions" of U.S. workers. Id. at 893 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (2000)). The Court reasoned that not applying the NLRA to
undocumented workers would frustrate these purposes, because it could lead to employer
preference for these workers (vis-A-vis legal workers), which, in turn, would adversely affect
the "wages and employment conditions of lawful residents." Id.
Only Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the "predicate
question." Id. at 913 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("It is unlikely that Congress intended the term
'employee' to include-for purposes of being accorded the benefits of [the NLRA]-persons
wanted by the United States for the violation of our criminal laws.").
76. Id. at 902-03.
77. Id. at 903-05.
78. Id. at 902-03 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 903 (further explaining that an undocumented worker's unlawful presence in
the U.S. rendered that worker "'unavailable' for work" for back pay accrual and tolling
purposes).
80. Id. (quoting Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).
81. Id. at 903.
82. Id. at 898.
83. Id. at 905-06.
84. Id. at 902-05. The Supreme Court offered at least two other reasons for rejecting
any minimum back pay remedy for undocumented workers under the NLRA. First, the
Court stated that the Seventh Circuit had "overstep[ped] the limits of its own reviewing
authority" (and "exceeded its narrow scope of review") because it had expanded the NLRB's
original remedial order and thus "usurped" the NLRB's "delegated function" to "determine a
just backpay remedy." Id. at 898-900, 900 n.10.
Second, the Court noted that the minimum back pay remedy exceeded the NLRB's
own remedial authority under the NLRA. Id. at 900 (stating that the NLRA requires remedial
orders to "effectuate the policies of the Act" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court
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noted that this minimum back pay award was "without regard to the
[undocumented] employees' . . . legal availability for work. '8 5 As
mentioned above, the Court viewed this "legal availability" limitation as
' 86
necessary to "avoid[]" any "potential conflict with the INA."
Second, the Court was unmoved by the Seventh Circuit's rationale for a
minimum back pay award-namely, to ensure at least "some relief to the
employees as well as a financial disincentive [to the employer] against the
repetition of similar discriminatory acts in the future." 87 The Court fully
appreciated the Seventh Circuit's concerns-in fact, it sympathetically
recognized the "probable unavailability" of reinstatement and back pay
remedies for Sure-Tan's undocumented workers, given the "uncertainty"
that they could establish that they were "lawfully available for employment
during the backpay period" or had "enter[ed] the country lawfully to accept
the reinstatement offers." 88
Nonetheless, the Court stated that this
"probable unavailability of the [NLRA's] more effective remedies in light
of the practicalworkings of the immigration laws.., simply cannot justify
the judicial arrogation of remedial authority not fairly encompassed within
'89
the Act."
As a final but related point, the Court addressed the important argument
(in Justice William J. Brennan's opinion) that there was a "disturbing
anomaly" in finding that undocumented workers were "employees" with
NLRA rights, yet "effectively depriv[ing them] of any remedy" under the
NLRA. 90 The Court was not persuaded by, and rejected, that argument for

explained that any NLRB remedial order must be "tailored to the unfair labor practice it is
intended to redress" and seek to "expunge only the actual, and not merely speculative,
consequences of the unfair labor practices." Id. The Court concluded that any minimum
back pay award under the NLRA constituted "pure speculation" and was inconsistent with
the "general reparative policies of the NLRA." Id. at 901.
85. Id. at 904.
86. Id. at 903.
87. Id. at 903-04 (citing NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 606 (7th Cir. 1982)).
88. Id. at 904.
89. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also addressed the Seventh Circuit's modifications
to the NLRB's reinstatement remedy, which included, inter alia, requiring that reinstatement
offers remain open for a period of four years. Id. at 905-06; see also supra note 69 and
accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit changes to the NLRB's reinstatement
remedy). The Court struck down those modifications on the grounds that the Seventh
Circuit had "exceeded its limited authority of judicial review." Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 90506.
90. Id. at 904 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 911-12 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "disturbing anomaly" created
when undocumented workers are deemed "employees" under the NLRA and thus "entitled to
all of the protections that come with that status" but then "stripped of the normal remedial
protections of the Act").
A second argument in Justice Brennan's opinion was that "the Court's decision to
restrict drastically the remedies available to undocumented alien employees" under the
NLRA would undermine, not promote, federal immigration law and policy. Id. at 912.
Specifically, he argued that employers would be encouraged to hire undocumented alien
employees once they realize "they may violate the NLRA with respect to [those employees]
without fear of having to recompense those workers for lost backpay." Id.
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two reasons. First, the Court noted that other "traditional remedies" under
the NLRA-such as cease and desist orders and any subsequent contempt
proceedings-still existed and provided "a significant deterrent against
future violations" of the NLRA. 9 1
Second, the Court-while candidly recognizing that the availability of
reinstatement and back pay remedies would provide "more ...deterrence"
against NLRA violations and "more meaningful relief' for undocumented
workers 92-refused
to be guided solely by those negative policy
consequences. 93 Instead, the Court concluded that it "remain[ed] bound to
respect the directives of the INA as well as the NLRA and to guard against
judicial distortion of the statutory limits placed by Congress on the
94
[NLRB's] remedial authority.
2. Post-IRCA-The Hoffman Plastic Decision
In the almost twenty years after Sure-Tan, the federal circuits disagreed
as to whether the "legal (or lawful) presence" condition for NLRA back pay
applied to all, or only certain, undocumented workers. Three federal
circuits (the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits) had concluded that this condition should be applied narrowlynamely, only to undocumented workers who (like those in Sure-Tan) were
already physically absent from the United States. 95 In contrast, one federal
circuit (the Seventh Circuit) had decided that this condition should be
applied universally-namely, to all such workers, regardless of presence in,
96
or absence from, the country.

91. Id. at 904 n.13; see also supra note 62 (discussing the NLRA's remedial scheme).
92. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904 n.13.
93. See id.
94. Id. (also noting that "[a]ny other solution must be sought in Congress and not the
courts").
95. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 642-46 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (interpreting Sure-Tan to preclude back pay remedies "only to undocumented
discriminatees who were unavailable for work because they were outside the country and
unable to lawfully reenter" and rejecting the argument that Sure-Tan created an "absolute bar
to any award of backpay for undocumented discriminatees"); NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil
Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 54-55, 58 (2d Cir. 1997) (reaffirming its interpretation that
Sure-Tan addressed "only awards of backpay to undocumented employees who have left the
country" and thus allowing back pay when those employees "remain in the United States
after their illegal termination"); Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB,
795 F.2d 705, 715-17, 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that Sure-Tan did "not address the
question whether an undocumented worker who remains in the United States, and who has
not been the subject of any INS deportation proceedings, is barred from receiving backpay to
remedy an NLRA violation").
96. See Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1119-21 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting the "narrower interpretation" that Sure-Tan "applies only to undocumented aliens
who are no longer within the United States" and stating that "the text of the opinion is quite
clear-undocumented aliens may not receive backpay unless they can show that they were
'lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States' (quoting Sure-Tan, 467
U.S. at 903)).
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In its March 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastic, the Supreme Court
substantially cleared these muddied waters. 97 Hoffman Plastic was a
chemical compound formulation business that had hired Jose Castro as a
machine operator in May 1988.98 At the time of his hire, "Castro presented
documents that appeared to verify his authorization to work in the United
States." 99 In fact, however, he had "gain[ed] employment with Hoffman
only after [fraudulently] tendering a birth certificate belonging to a friend
who was born in Texas."' 0 0 About six months after Castro was hired,
several employees (including Castro) supported a local union that was
attempting to become the collective bargaining agent for the business's
and others
employees. 10 1 Hoffman Plastic then proceeded to lay off Castro
10 2
who had participated in these support and organizing activities.
The NLRB concluded that Hoffman Plastic had engaged in unfair labor
practices under the NLRA by discriminatorily laying off Castro and others
"in order to rid itself of known union supporters." 103 The NLRB then
ordered Hoffman Plastic to provide appropriate "make whole" back pay to
these employees to compensate for "any loss of earnings and other benefits
they may have suffered."' 104 After a hearing to determine the amount of this
due back pay, the NLRB awarded Castro-who still remained in the
country after his layoff-four and a half years of back pay, totaling almost
$67,000.105

97. See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
98. Id. at 140.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 141. There is no indication in the Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit opinions that Hoffman Plastic was aware, or became aware during Jose
Castro's employment, that he had fraudulently used another person's birth certificate to
obtain his employment. See id. at 140-43; Hoffman Plastic,237 F.3d at 640-42.
101. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 140.
102. Id. at 140.
103. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (Hoffman Plastic 1), 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 100
(1992).
104. Id. at 107.
105. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (Hoffman Plastic I1), 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1062
(1998). The NLRB concluded that any reinstatement remedy would be inappropriate
because it would require Hoffman Plastic to employ knowingly an undocumented worker in
violation of the IRCA. Id. at 1061-62; see also A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320
N.L.R.B. 408, 415 (1995), affd, 134 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogatedby Hoffman Plastic,
535 U.S. 137 (explaining that that it could not require reinstatement of an undocumented
worker because, per Sure-Tan, it could "not order remedies that entail conduct in violation of
immigration statutes").
In support of its back pay decision, the NLRB "adhere[d]" to its narrow
interpretation of Sure-Tan as applying only to undocumented workers who were not
physically present in the country. Hoffman Plastic II, 326 N.L.R.B. at 1060-62 (discussing
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320 N.L.R.B. at 416, which states that Sure-Tan-which
not foreclose the possibility of
involved employees "who had left the country"."did
backpay for ... undocumented aliens," and approving an "award of backpay in this case, in
which the employees may remain in the United States"). According to the NLRB, "the most
effective way to accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in [the
IRCA]" was to extend all traditional "protections and remedies of the [NLRA]" to
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the NLRB's remedial order that
provided this back pay to Castro, notwithstanding his undocumented
worker status. 10 6 The court employed a two-step rationale to support its
decision. First, addressing Sure-Tan, the D.C. Circuit narrowly interpreted
its "legal (or lawful) presence" condition for NLRA back pay to "deal with
the precise problem [the Seventh Circuit] faced-undocumented
10 7
discriminatees returning to the country illegally to claim backpay."'
Consequently, the court viewed Sure-Tan as "not bar[ring] back pay to
undocumented discriminatees" on a universal basis, but rather
dealing only
'1 08
with "unique circumstances... not present in this case."
Having overcome Sure-Tan, the D.C. Circuit then opted merely to defer
to the NLRB's administrative authority and discretion to fashion
appropriate remedial relief in Castro's circumstances.10 9 The court initially
noted that an administrative agency's decisions must both "'fully enforce
the requirements of its own statute"' 1 10 and accommodate, rather than
ignore, "'other . . .equally important Congressional objectives."' I The
D.C. Circuit then concluded that the NLRB had "fully satisfied" these
administrative obligations by considering both the NLRA and IRCA when
crafting Castro's back pay remedy. 112 More specifically, the NLRB had
argued that back pay relief for undocumented workers served the purposes
and policies of both statutes, by (i) "reduc[ing] employer incentives to
prefer undocumented workers ([the] IRCA's goal)"; (ii) "reinforc[ing]
collective bargaining rights for all workers (the NLRA's goal)"; and (iii)
"protect[ing] wages and working conditions for authorized workers (the
goal of both Acts)." 1 3 Consequently, the court concluded that the NLRB
had "fully enforce[d]" the NLRA, while "carefully consider[ing]" (and not
' 14
ignoring) "other... equally important Congressional objectives." "
The Supreme Court reversed. 1 5 In a broadly worded holding, the Court
stated that the NLRB's "award[ of] backpay to an undocumented alien who
has never been legally authorized to work in the United States . . .is

undocumented workers who did not fall within Sure-Tan's facts. Hoffman Plastic II, 326
N.L.R.B. at 1060 (following A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320 N.L.R.B. 408).

106. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 640, 650 (D.C. Cir.
2001).

107. Id. at 644-45 (noting that "two of the three Circuits that have addressed this issue
agree with our interpretation of Sure-Tan").
108. Id. at 642; see also id. at 640 ("Properly understood, Sure-Tan supports backpay
awards to undocumented discriminatees ....
109. Id. at 646-50.
110. Id. at 647 (quoting N.Y. Shipping Ass'n v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1367
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
111. Id. at 646-47 (quoting S.S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).
112. Id. at 650.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting S. S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 47).
115. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
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foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the
116
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)."
As a preliminary matter, the Court addressed Sure-Tan. 117 While
recognizing the current circuit split regarding whether Sure-Tan's "legal (or
lawful) presence" condition on NLRA back pay "applies only to aliens who
left the United States,"' 118 the Supreme Court looked beyond Sure-Tan to
"resolve this controversy." ' 1 9 Specifically, the Court stated that it thought
"the question presented here better analyzed through a wider lens, focused
as it must be on a legal landscape now significantly changed" via the
120
IRCA.
The Court next addressed whether it should merely defer-as the D.C.
Circuit had-to the NLRB's administrative authority and discretion in
fashioning Castro's back pay remedy. 12 1 While noting the NLRB's
"generally broad" discretion to select and craft remedies for NLRA
violations, 122 the Court stated that it had "never deferred to the [NLRB's]
remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon
federal statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA."' 12 3 Consequently, the
Court concluded that an NLRB-fashioned remedy "may be required to
24
yield" when it "trenches upon" another federal statute or policy.1

Asking whether Castro's back pay remedy "trenches upon" another
federal statute or policy, the Court bluntly answered: "[I]t is precisely the
situation today." 12 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined exactly

how the NLRB's back pay remedy for Castro "trenche[d] upon" both the
126
express terms and policies embodied in the IRCA.

116. Id. Just like in its Sure-Tan decision, the Court decided Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB by a five to four margin. The five member majority was
comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor (just as in Sure-Tan), in addition
to Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas (in effect, replacing
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Powell from the Sure-Tan majority). The four
member minority was comprised of Justice Stevens (just as in Sure-Tan), in addition to
Justices Stephen G. Breyer, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg (in effect, replacing
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun from the Sure-Tan minority). See id. at 140; id. at
153 (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra note 75 (discussing the five to four margin in Sure-Tan).
The Court left undisturbed the Sure-Tan Court's initial holding regarding the
NLRA's applicability to undocumented workers (as covered "employees" of the Act).
Instead, it merely noted that "[o]ur first holding in Sure-Tan is not at issue here and does not
bear at all on the scope of [the NLRB's] remedies with respect to undocumented workers."
Id. at 149 n.4.
117. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 144-47.
118. Id. at 146-47.
119. Id. at 147.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 142-44, 147.
122. Id. at 142.
123. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 147.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 147-52.
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As to the IRCA's express terms, the Court recognized that the IRCA
"combat[ed] the employment of illegal aliens" by explicitly targeting both
employers and undocumented workers with sanctions for engaging 12in7
prohibited conduct in the employment and hiring processes.
Specifically, the Court correctly observed that
it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the
United States without some party directly contravening explicit
congressional policies. Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent
identification, which subverts the cornerstone of [the] IRCA's
enforcement mechanism [i.e., the employment verification system], or the
employer knowingly hires
the undocumented alien in direct contradiction
28
of its IRCA obligations.1
Evaluating the impact of Castro's back pay remedy upon these IRCA's
express terms, the Court concluded that "allowing the [NLRB] to award
backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in [the]
IRCA."' 129 Importantly, the Court highlighted that "Castro's use of false
documents to obtain employment . . .violated the[] provisions"' 130 that

"made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false
documents."' 13 1 Repeatedly emphasizing this unlawful conduct, the Court
viewed Castro's actions as "misconduct that render[ed] an underlying

132

employment relationship illegal under explicit provisions offederal law."'

As a result, the Court concluded that the NLRB's back pay remedy for
Castro "discount[ed] the misconduct of illegal alien employees" under the
IRCA and thereby "subvert[ed]" and "trivialize[d]" the express terms of
133
"the immigration laws."'
As to the IRCA's policies, the Court stressed that the "central" focus of
"'[t]he policy of immigration law' was "combating the employment of
illegal aliens."' 34 Assessing the effect of the NLRB's back pay remedy
upon IRCA policy, the Court similarly concluded that "awarding backpay

127. Id. at 147; see supra Part L.A (discussing the IRCA and the applicable prohibited
conduct and sanctions (civil and/or criminal) for employers and undocumented workers).
128. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S at 148 (emphasis added) (also noting that the IRCA
"makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system by
tendering fraudulent documents").
129. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 148.
131. Id. at 149.
132. Id. at 146 (emphasis added); see also id. at 143 (discussing NLRA precedent where
the Court had set aside back pay or reinstatement remedies to employees who were "found
guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment" or who "themselves
had committed serious criminal acts"); id. at 149 (stating that Castro's job had been
"obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud"); id. at 151 n.5 (noting that the IRCA
"expressly criminalizes the ...employment relationship at issue in this case").
133. Id. at 150.
134. Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights,
Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8 (1991)).
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to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying [the] IRCA."' 135 The
Court then highlighted two key ways in which Castro's back pay remedy
"trench[ed] upon" the IRCA's policy of combating the employment of
36
undocumented workers.1
First, the Court stated that the NLRB's back pay remedy would "condone
prior violations of the immigration laws" by undocumented workers such as
Castro, who had tendered false documents to obtain employment. 13 7 The
Court reasoned that permitting back pay to those like Castro simply
the misconduct of illegal alien
overlooked and "discount[ed]
employees,"' 138 who may then still "remain[] in the United States illegally,
and continue[] to work illegally."' 139 According to the140Court, there was "no
reason to think that Congress" intended such a result.
Second, the Court noted that the NLRB's back pay award to an
undocumented worker such as Castro would also "encourage[] future
14 1
violations" of the IRCA, whether by the worker or employers in general.
The Court reasoned that a system of awarding back pay to undocumented
workers-particularly those who had not yet departed from the countryserved as an inducement for them to "remain[] inside the United States
illegally."' 142 According to the Court, those undocumented workers who
remain would "trigger[ future,] new IRCA violations, either by tendering
false documents to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore
43
[the] IRCA and hire illegal workers."'
As a concluding point, the Court addressed the primary argument in
Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent-namely, that foreclosing the NLRA's
back pay remedy to undocumented workers frustrates the policies behind
both (i) the federal labor laws (i.e., by removing the remedy that acts as an
effective deterrent to unlawful employer conduct under the NLRA) and (ii)
the federal immigration laws (i.e., by creating a "perverse economic
144
incentive" for employers "to find and to hire illegal-alien-employees").
135. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 149-52.
137. Id. at 151.

138. Id. at 150.
139. Id. at 149.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 150, 151.
142. Id. at 150.
143. Id. at 151 (similarly stating that NLRB back pay awards to undocumented workers
like Castro would "encourage the successful evasion of apprehension [of these workers] by
immigration authorities").
144. See id. at 152; id. at 153-56, 160 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As to frustration of the
federal labor laws, Justice Breyer argued that the NLRA's back pay remedy "serve[d]
critically important remedial purposes" of "victim compensation" and "deterrence, i.e.,
discouraging employers from violating the Nation's labor laws." Id. at 153-54 (similarly
stating that back pay "reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity"); see also id. at 154
(viewing the NLRA's back pay remedy as "necessary" to "help[] make labor law
enforcement credible" and to "make[] clear that violating the labor laws will not pay"); id. at
160 (stating that "the same backpay award that compensates an employee ... also requires
an employer who has violated the labor laws to make a meaningful monetary payment"
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The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the Court noted
that the NLRB's "[l]ack of authority to award backpay does not mean that
the employer gets off scot-free."' 145 Akin to the Sure-Tan Court, the Court
stated that employers (like Hoffman Plastic) were still subject to "other
significant sanctions" under the NLRA, including cease-and-desist orders,
the obligation to post work notices that detail unlawful conduct, and
"contempt proceedings should it fail to comply with these orders." 146
These other sanctions, said the Court, are "sufficient to effectuate national
labor policy regardless of whether the 'spur and catalyst' of back pay
' 147
accompaniesthem."
Second, the Court reiterated Sure-Tan's point that it was not the role of
the courts (which must be guided by the "'practical workings of the
immigration laws"') to address any "'perceived deficienc[y] in the NLRA's
existing remedial arsenal"'
stemming from back pay foreclosure to
148
undocumented workers.
II. THE VARYING REMEDIAL APPROACHES FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
The Supreme Court's Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic decisions addressed
the remedial rights of undocumented workers under the NLRA. Because
the Court has never addressed this issue in the context of the federal

(emphasis omitted)). Consequently, the dissent argued that removal of this "backpay
weapon" from the NLRB's "remedial arsenal" (and the resulting availability of only "futureoriented" remedies) could (i) lead employers to believe that "they can violate the labor
laws. .. with impunity," and (ii) thereby "undermine[] the public policies that underlie the
Nation's labor laws." Id. at 154, 160.
As to frustration of the federal immigration laws, Justice Breyer maintained that
denial of this back pay remedy for undocumented workers would create a "perverse
economic incentive" for employers to hire them. Id. at 155. More specifically, the dissent
noted that the absence of potential back pay liability serves to "lower the cost to the
employer of an initial labor law violation." Id. Those lower costs, argued Justice Breyer,
would increase (rather than diminish) the "magnetic force" and "incentive to find and to
hire" these undocumented workers. Id. at 155; see also id. at 156 (stating that precluding the
NLRA's back pay remedy would "encourag[e these employers] to take risks, i.e., to hire
with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment...
ultimately will lower the costs of labor law violations"). Justice Breyer's argument on this
point is comparable to that made by Justice Brennan in his Sure-Tan opinion. See supra note
90 (discussing Justice Brennan's argument that "restrict[ing] drastically" the NLRA
remedies for undocumented workers would serve to undermine federal immigration law and
policy).
145. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 152.
146. Id; see also supra note 63 (discussing the NLRA's remedial scheme); supra note 91
and accompanying text (discussing the Sure-Tan Court's view that the board's "traditional
remedies" provided a "significant deterrent" against future NLRA violations).
147. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). The "spur and catalyst"
language had previously appeared in the Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (citing United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d
354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)), which used the language "spur or catalyst."
148. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 152 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904
(1984)).
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employment discrimination laws, the federal courts have attempted to fill
this void. The results of these judicial efforts have been three distinct, yet
inconsistent, approaches regarding these workers' remedial rights under the
14 9
federal employment discrimination laws.
In crafting their respective approaches, courts answer-whether
explicitly or implicitly-two key questions:
(1) Whether, as a general matter, the Supreme Court's NLRA
precedent-Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic-extends beyond the
NLRA context and applies to the federal employment
discrimination law contexts?
(2) If so, what monetary remedies under these federal employment
discrimination laws are foreclosed to undocumented workers?
The three remedial approaches provide different sets of answers to these
questions.
The first remedial approach never gets beyond the first
question-it finds the Supreme Court's NLRA precedent inapplicable to the
federal employment discrimination laws and thus forecloses no monetary
remedies to undocumented workers under those laws. 150 In contrast, both
the second and third remedial approaches find that this NLRA precedent
crosses over to the contexts of the federal employment discrimination
laws. 151 However, these two approaches diverge on the extent of the
remedial foreclosure for undocumented workers: (i) the second approach
forecloses only some monetary remedies; 152 and (ii) the third approach
forecloses all monetary remedies. 153 Thus, at present, there is no consistent
judicial philosophy regarding the monetary remedial rights of
undocumented workers under the federal employment discrimination laws.
The chart below summarizes these three remedial approaches.

Remedial
Approach

Apply Supreme Court's NLRA
Precedent to Federal
Employment Discrimination
Law Contexts?

Monetary Remedies
Foreclosed to
Undocumented
Workers:

First

No

None

Second

Yes

Some: back pay and
front pay (in lieu of
reinstatement)

Third

Yes

All

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Parts II.BI.D.
infra Part II.B.
infra Parts II.C-II.D.
infra Part II.C.
infra Part lI.D.
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Before providing judicial examples of these three remedial approaches,
this part first describes the monetary remedies that are available under Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. An understanding of the nature and
purpose(s) of these remedies-which include damages in addition to those
available under the NLRA--can be helpful in assessing the viability and
impact of the current remedial approaches.
A. Available Monetary Remedies Under Title VII, the ADA,
and the ADEA
Until 1991, Title VII "afforded only 'equitable' remedies" to prevailing
plaintiffs. 154 In particular, it expressly empowered the courts (i) to "order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
1 55

pay

. .

. , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate"

and (ii) to award "a reasonable attorney'sfee (including expert fees) as part
While enumerating these equitable remedies, Title VII
of the costs ....
did not explicitly reference any front pay remedy.' 5 7 However, as
was authorized
recognized by the Supreme Court, front pay fell within, and 158
language.
catchall
relief'
equitable
other
"any
VII's
Title
by,
The purpose behind Title VII's equitable remedies was-and still is-to
"make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination." 159 Thus, the remedies of back pay and
"156

154. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 252 (1994); see also Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1999) (stating that, prior to 1991, "only equitable
relief.., was available to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs" and "no authority [existed under
Title VII] for an award of punitive or compensatory damages").
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added) (also permitting courts to enjoin
employers from continuing to engage in unlawful discriminatory practices); see also Pollard
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848-54 (2001) (generally discussing
available Title VII remedies before (and after) 1991).
These Title VII remedial provisions were modeled after, and are almost identical to,
those of the NLRA. See id. at 848-49 (stating that Title VI's remedial provisions "closely
tracked the language of § 10(c)" of the NLRA); Landgraf,511 U.S. at 252-53 (stating that
"Title VII's backpay remedy[ was] modeled on that of the [NLRA]" (footnote omitted)); see
also supra note 63 (discussing the NLRA's remedial scheme).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (emphasis added).
157. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
158. See Pollard, 532 U.S. at 853-54 (stating that the front pay remedy-whether "in lieu
of reinstatement" or "for the period between the date of judgment and the date of [any]
reinstatement"--was "authorized under" Title VII's equitable remedy provisions); see also
id. at 850-51 (stating that "[b]y 1991, virtually all of the courts of appeals had recognized
that 'front pay' was a remedy authorized under" Title VII's equitable remedy provisions and
that "no court of appeals appears to have ever held to the contrary"); id. at 853 n.3 (stating
that the federal circuits have "consistently ... construed [Title VII's 'other equitable relief
language] as authorizing front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement"); United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229, 239 n.9 (1992) (noting that "courts have allowed Title VII plaintiffs who were
wrongfully discharged and for whom reinstatement was not feasible to recover 'front pay' or
future lost earnings").
159. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975) (stating that "[tihe
'make whole' purpose of Title VII is made evident by the legislative history"); see also
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reinstatement (or front pay in lieu thereof) seek to "restor[e] victims ...

to

the wage and employment positions they would have occupied [at their
employer] absent the unlawful discrimination."' 160 Mathematically, the
back pay remedy represents "the difference between the amount the
claimant would have earned [in his or her position at the employer] absent
the discrimination and the amount of wages actually earned during the
relevant period" prior to judgment. 16 1 The front pay remedy, on the other
hand, corresponds to
lost compensation [from a plaintiff's position at his or her employer]
during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of
reinstatement. For instance, when an appropriate position for the plaintiff
is not immediately available without displacing an incumbent employee,
courts have ordered reinstatement upon the opening of such a position and
have orderedfront pay to be paid until reinstatementoccurs. In cases in
which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility between
the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological
injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination, courts
162
have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement.
In 1991, however, the landscape of available Title VII remedies changed.
In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act), 16 3 Congress
amended Title VII and "expanded the remedies available to ... plaintiffs by

permitting, for the first time, the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages."

164

Compensatory damages may be awarded for a Title VII

Landgraf,511 U.S. at 252-53 (stating that "Title VII's back pay remedy.., is a 'makewhole' remedy"); EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that, under
Title VII, "[t]he trial court 'has broad equitable discretion to fashion back pay awards in
order to make the Title VII victim whole' (quoting EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973
F.2d 664, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1992))).
160. Burke, 504 U.S. at 239 (citing Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418) (similarly
stating that Title VII's equitable remedies address "the unlawful deprivation of full wages
earned or due for services performed" and thus permit an employee to "recover only an
amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned [at his employer] from the date
of discharge to the date of reinstatement").
161. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d at 744 (emphasis added); see also Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep't
of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[b]ack pay is 'the difference
between the actual wages earned and the wages the individual would have earned in the
position' without the discrimination (quoting Gunby v. Pa. Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 111920 (3d Cir. 1988))).
162. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also id. at 850
(stating that "[c]ourts [have traditionally] recognized that reinstatement was not always a
viable option, and that an award of front pay as a substitute for reinstatement in such cases
was a necessary part of the 'make whole' relief mandated by Congress" in Title VII);
Mclnnis v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing front pay
and noting that "reinstatement . . . 'may not be appropriate .

.

. when the employer has

exhibited such extreme hostility that, as a practical matter, a productive and amicable
working relationship would be impossible"' (quoting EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 1985))).
163. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
164. Pollard,532 U.S. at 848 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2000)
(providing compensatory and punitive damage remedies under Title VII); Landgraf 511
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plaintiff's "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
165
nonpecuniary losses."
While the 1991 Act allowed these supplemental Title VII remedies,
Congress limited them to certain types of discrimination cases and to
monetary caps. Specifically, a prevailing Title VII plaintiff can recover
compensatory and punitive damages only in cases where the employer
engaged in "unlawful intentionaldiscrimination" (i.e., cases that rely on a
"disparate treatment" theory, rather than a "disparate impact" theory). 166 In
addition, punitive damages are available only in a further subset of these
"intentional discrimination" cases-namely, those in which the employer
"engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of [the] aggrieved
individual. ' 16 7 Finally, the aggregate amount of a prevailing Title VII
plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages is subject to statutory caps

U.S. at 253, 254-55 (noting that "the [Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the]1991 Act[)] effect[ed] a
major expansion in the relief available to victims of employment discrimination" and
"significantly expand[ed] the monetary relief potentially available to plaintiffs").
These new remedies were "in addition to any relief' then available under Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), and did "not replace or duplicate" the existing make-whole
remedies. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 253; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (stating that Title
VII's compensatory damages "shall not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other
type of relief' already authorized under Title VII); Pollard,532 U.S. at 854 (noting that the
compensatory and punitive damage remedies are "in addition to previously available
remedies, such as front pay").
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 74 (1991),
reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 612 (stating that "[c]ompensatory damages include, but
are not limited to, monetary relief for humiliation, pain and suffering, other psychological
and physical harm, and loss of civil rights; medical expenses incurred as a result of
psychological or physical harm; and other economic losses and out-of-pocket costs");
Akouri, 408 F.3d at 1345 (stating that Title VII's compensatory damages may "compensate[]
for intangible, psychological injuries as well as financial, property, or physical harms").
The "future pecuniary losses" aspect of Title VII's compensatory damages does not
include the front pay remedy. See Pollard, 532 U.S. at 852 (recognizing that "future
pecuniary losses" could, "out of context" and "in the abstract," be viewed as including front
pay, but holding that front pay is not to be included within Title VII's compensatory
damages and the statutory caps).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n,
527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999) (stating that "[t]he 1991 Act limits compensatory and punitive
damages awards ... to cases of 'intentional discrimination'-that is, cases that do not rely
on the 'disparate impact' theory of discrimination").
167. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(1); see also Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534 ("The very structure of
[section] 1981 a suggests a congressional intent to authorize punitive awards in only a subset
of cases involving intentional discrimination.... Congress plainly sought to impose two
standards of liability--one for establishing a right to compensatory damages and another,
higher standard that a plaintiff must satisfy to qualify for a punitive award."). Generally, an
employer acts with the requisite "malice or reckless indifference" when it "at least
discriminate[s] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law." Id. at
535-36 (stating that the proper inquiry "pertain[s] to the employer's knowledge that it may
be acting in violation offederal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination"
(emphasis added)).
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that range from $50,000 to $300,000, depending upon the number of
68

employees.1
In adding compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII's remedies,
Congress aimed to serve three important purposes. First, Congress intended
to provide more "appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and
unlawful harassment,"' 16 9 thus affording more "adequate compensation for
victims of discrimination." 170 Specifically, Congress reasoned that "[t]he
limitation of relief under Title VII to equitable remedies often means that
victims of intentional discrimination may not recover for the very real
effects of the discrimination."' 7 1 Stressing this inadequacy in Title VII's
equitable relief, Congress noted that
[v]ictims of intentional sexual or religious discrimination in
employment terms and conditions often endure terrible humiliation, pain
and suffering. This distress often manifests itself in emotional disorders
and medical problems. Victims of discrimination often suffer substantial
out-of-pocket expenses as a result of the discrimination, none of which is
72
compensable with equitable remedies.1

Second, Congress aimed "to encourage citizens to act as private attorneys
general to enforce" their Title VII rights via these potentially lucrative
compensatory and punitive damages. 173 Congress sensed and suspected
that, due to the limited equitable relief then available under Title VII,

"victims of intentional discrimination

1 74
seeking to vindicate their civil rights."'

[have been] discouraged from

168. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (specifying a $50,000 cap for employers with between 15
and 100 employees, a $100,000 cap for employers with between 101 and 200 employees, a
$200,000 cap for employers with between 201 and 500 employees, and a $300,000 cap for
employers with 501 or more employees).
169. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
170. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1, reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694 (also noting
that the 1991 Act was intended to "strengthen existing protections and remedies available
under federal civil rights laws to provide ... adequate compensation for victims of
discrimination"); see also id., pt. 1, at 14-15 (noting that one of the purposes of the 1991 Act
was to "provide monetary remedies for victims of intentional employment discrimination to
compensate them for resulting injuries" (emphasis added)).
171. Id., pt. 2, at 25; see also id., pt. 1, at 64-65 (stating that additional "[m]onetarty [sic]
damages also are necessary to make discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to
their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity"); id
at 68 (stating that Title VII's equitable relief "[a]ll too frequently ... leaves prevailing
plaintiffs without remedies for their injuries").
172. Id., pt. 2, at 25 (emphasis added); see also id., pt 1, at 66 (similarly stating that
"[v]ictims of intentional discrimination often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering,
psychological harm and related medical problems, which in turn cause [them] to suffer
substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses and other economic losses as a result of the
discrimination").
173. Id., pt. 1, at 64-65; see also id. at 70 (finding that "permitting the recovery of such
damages would enhance the effectiveness of Title VII by... encouraging private
enforcement").
174. Id., pt. 2, at 25; see also id., pt. 1, at 70 (stating that Title VII's limited back pay
relief "serves as a powerful disincentive for victims to seek to vindicate their rights").
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Finally, Congress intended "to deter unlawful harassment and intentional
discrimination in the workplace" by exposing employers to these additional
and more costly remedies. 175 According to Congress, Title VII's limited
equitable relief had "not served as an effective deterrent" for employmentrelated discrimination 76 and had "allow[ed] employers who discriminate to
avoid any meaningful liability."' 177 Consequently, Congress authorized
compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII to "raise the cost of an
employer's engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby providing
employers with additional incentives to prevent intentional discrimination
178
in the workplace before it happens."'
As to available monetary remedies under the ADA, that act merely
incorporates by reference Title VII's remedial provisions, 179 and
Congress-through the 1991 Act-similarly expanded the ADA's remedies
to include compensatory and punitive damages. 180 Consequently, the
remedies available to an ADA plaintiff are identical to those available under
Title VII.
Finally, the ADEA provides remedial relief that is similar-but not
identical-to that available under Title VII and the ADA. Interestingly, the
ADEA incorporates by reference certain remedial provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 181 and classifies age-based employment
discrimination as a "prohibited act under" the FLSA's antiretaliation

175. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991); see
also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 14, reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 552 (noting that
one of the purposes of the 1991 Act was to "provide monetary remedies for victims of
intentional employment discrimination.., to provide more effective deterrence"); id. at 70
(finding that "permitting the recovery of such damages would enhance the effectiveness of
Title VII by ... deterring future acts of discrimination"); id., pt. 2, at 1 (noting that the 1991
Act was intended to "strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal
civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence").
176. Id.,pt. 1, at 69.
177. Id. at 68.
178. Id. at 65; see also id. at 69 (stating that "[m]aking employers liable for all losseseconomic and otherwise-which are incurred as a consequence of prohibited
discrimination . . . will serve as a necessary deterrent to future acts of discrimination, both
for those held liable for damages as well as the employer community as a whole").
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (stating that the "remedies... set forth in [Title VII's
remedial section of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5] shall be the ... remedies... provide[d] to ... any

person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation" of the ADA's
employment-related provisions).
180. See id. § 1981a(a)(2) (stating that compensatory and punitive damages are equally
recoverable by prevailing plaintiffs under the ADA).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) (stating that the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance
with the ... remedies ... provided" in section 216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
(except for the penalties of fines and imprisonment articulated in section 216(a)). Generally,
the FLSA requires that employers (i) pay at least the federally established minimum wage
rate and (ii) pay overtime compensation (at one and a half times the applicable "regular rate"
of pay) to nonexempt employees who work in excess of forty hours per week. Id. §§
206(a)(1), 207(a)(1). In addition, it contains an antiretaliation provision similar to those of
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Id. § 215(a)(3); see supra notes 3-5 (describing Title
VII's, the ADA's, and the ADEA's antiretaliation provisions, respectively).
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provision. 182 Under the FLSA, this type of violation exposes the employer
to (i) "legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of [the FLSA], including without limitation employment,
reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages"183 and (ii) payment of a "reasonable
184
attorney's fee.., and costs of the action."

Thus, the ADEA affords the same equitable remedies to prevailing
plaintiffs as Title VII and the ADA afford-namely, back pay (as "wages

lost"), reinstatement (or front pay in lieu thereof, as "wages lost"), and

attorneys' fees. 185 Yet, instead of providing "compensatory damages" or
"punitive damages," the ADEA allows recovery of "liquidated damages"
in

an amount "equal" to any "wages lost," thus providing, in effect, "double
damages." 186 In addition, Congress limited liquidated damages to "cases of
87
willful violations" of the ADEA. 1
The nature and purpose of the ADEA's liquidated damages is clear:

188
"Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature."

Furthermore, and similar to one of the stated purposes behind Title VII's

182. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see supra note 181 (discussing the FLSA's antiretaliation
provision).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). The "wages lost" component includes both
back pay and front pay in lieu of reinstatement, if warranted. See Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola
Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that "[c]ourts have
permitted ADEA plaintiffs to recover 'front pay' in addition to the usual award of back pay"
(citation omitted)).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 626(b) (similarly providing that,
in any ADEA action, "the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief
as may be appropriate

.. .

, including without limitation judgments compelling employment,

reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section" and stating that any
"[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of [the ADEA] shall be deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of [the FLSA's
remedial scheme]") (emphasis added).
185. See supra notes 154-58, 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing the equitable
remedies available under Title VII and the ADA).
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (including "liquidated damages" within the FLSA's remedial
provisions, which the ADEA incorporates by reference at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (discussing the ADEA's liquidated
damages remedy and its resulting effect of "double damages").
187. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). In order for an employer to commit the requisite "willful
violation[]" of the ADEA, it must "kn[o]w or show[] reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the [ADEA]." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 615-17 (1993).
188. Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 125; see, e.g., Cross v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
417 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that "'liquidated damages may fairly be
characterized as 'punitive in nature' [because] they do after all provide an ADEA victim
with more than his or her out-of-pocket damages or any other strictly compensatory
amounts' (quoting McGinty v. New York, 193 F.3d 64, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1999))); Potence v.
Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Trans World Airlines, 469
U.S. at 126, and stating that "[b]oth the Supreme Court and this court have held that the
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA was intended to be punitive in nature"); Carberry
v. Monarch Mktg. Sys., Inc., 30 F. App'x. 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the ADEA's
liquidated damages "are 'punitive' in nature").

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

compensatory and punitive damages, Congress viewed "liquidated damages
' 89
awards as 'an effective deterrent to willful violations of the ADEA. "1,
B. The FirstRemedial Approach:
Foreclosureof No Monetary Remedies
Under the first remedial approach, undocumented workers are not
foreclosed from any of the above-referenced monetary remedies under the
federal employment discrimination laws. This approach provides the
following answers to the above-referenced key questions on this issue:
(1) No-the Supreme Court's Hoffman Plastic and Sure-Tan
decisions do not extend beyond the NLRA context and apply to the
federal employment discrimination law contexts; and
(2) Consequently, no monetary remedies
undocumented workers under those laws.

are foreclosed

to

This first remedial approach is nicely reflected in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc. 190 In Rivera, the Ninth Circuit confronted
a Title VII national origin discrimination lawsuit by Martha Rivera and
almost two dozen other Latin and Asian employees, all of whom had been
terminated after poor performance on a job skills test given in English.' 9 1
These employees requested the full panoply of Title VII monetary
remedies-namely, "reinstatement (and front pay for those not electing
reinstatement), back pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and
192
attorneys fees."
During a deposition, Rivera was asked questions about her "immigration
status," but she refused to answer per her counsel's instruction.1 93
Subsequently, the magistrate judge issued a protective order that "barred all
discovery" on this issue because it "would unnecessarily chill legitimate

189. Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 125); see also McGinty, 193 F.3d at 70 (noting that
"liquidated damages are designed to deter willful violations of ADEA" (citation omitted));
Lindsey v. Ati. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1102 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that
"ADEA liquidated damages awards.., deter violators"); Kelly v. Am. Standard, Inc., 640
F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that "the award of liquidated damages ...is intended
to deter intentional violations of the ADEA" (citation omitted)).
Interestingly, the original bill for the ADEA had incorporated the FLSA's criminal
liability sanctions in cases of "willful violations" of the ADEA. Trans World Airlines, 469
U.S. at 125 (discussing the ADEA's legislative history). However, Congress opted to
substitute "liquidated damages" for these criminal liability sanctions, based on "the view that
liquidated damages could effectively supply the deterrent and punitive [functions] which
both criminal penalties and punitive damages normally serve." Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co.,
559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 125
(also discussing this legislative substitution).
190. 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 905 (2005).
191. Id. at 1061.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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claims of undocumented workers under Title VII. ' ' 194 On appeal, NIBCO
argued that a Title VII plaintiffs "immigration status" was relevant,
discoverable, and "essential to its defense," because Hoffman Plastic
19 5
"foreclose[d] any award of back pay to an undocumented plaintiff."
Because it affirmed the protective order on other grounds, the Ninth
Circuit initially noted that it "need not decide the Hoffman question in this
[Title VII] case." 196 Nonetheless, the court seized upon the opportunity to
194. Id. at 1061-62.
195. Id. at 1066 (similarly referencing NIBCO's contention that "each plaintiffs
immigration status governs her entitlement to reinstatement, front pay, and back pay on [her]
Title VII claim" and that "Hoffman precludes any award of back pay to an illegal immigrant,
no matter what federal statute the employer may have violated").
196. Id. at 1069; see also id. at 1074 n.19 (stating that "we have left open the question
whether Hoffman applies in a Title VII action").
The Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc. court bypassed the "Hoffman question" by viewing
separately the liability and remedy phases of Martha Rivera's Title VII lawsuit. See id. at
1069-70, 1074-75. Specifically, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that
Hoffman Plastic was relevant, if at all, only at the latter remedy phase, not at the former
liability phase. See id. at 1069-70 (stating that "[t]he information that NIBCO seeks is not
relevant to determining whether it has violated Title VII"); id. at 1070 (stating that "[i]t
makes no difference to the resolution of [the liability] question whether some of the plaintiffs
are ineligible for certain forms of statutory relief'); id. at 1074-75 (noting that "Hoffman
does not make immigration status relevant to the determination whether a defendant has
committed national origin discrimination under Title VII.... [T]he availability of backpay
remedies for certain plaintiffs will be determined, if at all, only after the liability phase.").
Because the Rivera litigation was still in the initial liability phase, the court was free to find
the "Hoffman question" unnecessary. Id. at 1069.
Freed from the "Hoffman question," the court affirmed the protective order because
"the substantial and particularized harm of the discovery-the chilling effect that the
disclosure of plaintiffs' immigration status could have upon their ability to effectuate their
rights-outweighed NIBCO's interests in obtaining the information at this early stage in the
litigation." Id. at 1064 (footnote omitted). For other cases in which courts have relied upon
this rationale to preclude discovery into a plaintiffs "immigration status" (especially during
a lawsuit's liability phase), see Perez-Farias v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. CV-05-3061, 2007
WL 1412796, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 10, 2007) (a federal and state employment
discrimination case citing Rivera and concluding that "[c]onsistent with Rivera, Defendants
are prohibited from questioning Plaintiffs regarding their immigration status"); EEOC v.
First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03-CV-4990, 2007 WL 586720, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2007) (a Title VII discrimination and retaliation case citing Rivera and finding that the
magistrate judge's protective order barring discovery into "immigration status" was proper,
because it was "a potential weapon for harassing and intimidating individuals" and had an
"in terrorem effect"); EEOC v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1087-88 (D. Minn. 2006)
(a Title VII discrimination and retaliation case citing Rivera and barring discovery regarding
immigration status because it would "have an unacceptable chilling effect on the bringing of
civil rights actions"); Avila-Blum v. Casa De Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 19192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (a federal employment discrimination case highlighting the "chilling
effect of inquiry into immigration status in connection with evidence sought in
discrimination and employment-related cases" and "concur[ring] with the analysis of other
courts that have.., concluded that such discovery should be barred" (citation omitted));
EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581, 582-83 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (a federal employment
discrimination case citing Rivera and barring discovery as to "immigration status" because
such questions "are oppressive,... constitute a substantial burden on the parties and on the
public interest and ... would have a chilling effect on victims of employment discrimination
from coming forward to assert discrimination claims"); EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc.,
225 F.R.D. 404, 405-06 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (a federal employment discrimination and
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discuss, in general terms, whether Hoffman Plastic extended beyond the
NLRA context and applied to the Title VII context. 197 Succinctly
answering that question, the Ninth Circuit stated: "We . .. specifically
believe it unlikely that [Hoffman Plastic] applies in Title VII cases." 198 The
Ninth Circuit stressed several primary points in support of this position.199
For example, and akin to Justice Breyer's contention in his Hoffman
Plastic dissent, 200 the court suggested that barring back pay (and other)
remedies under Title VII would frustrate their deterrent purpose and thus
compromise national antidiscrimination policy. 20 1 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit observed that Congress "armed" Title VII plaintiffs with a "full
complement of remedies"-"not only traditional remedies for employment
law violations, such as backpay, frontpay, and reinstatement, but also full
compensatory and punitive damages." 20 2 These "full" Title VII remedies,
noted the court, were designed "to punish employers who engage in
unlawful discriminatory acts," "to deter future discrimination both by the
defendant and by all other employers[,]" and to "vindicate national policy
of the highest priority. ' 20 3 Intimating that employers would be less deterred
from violating Title VII if they were not subject to its "severe remedies,
including backpay," 20 4 the court was "strongly" disinclined to find any
retaliation case noting that discovery of "immigration status" would "cause [plaintiffs]
embarrassment," subject them to "criminal charges and, possibly, deportation," and "would
significantly discourage employees from bringing actions against their employers who
engage in discriminatory employment practices," and concluding that the magistrate judge
had "properly relied on" Rivera to grant a protective order barring such discovery).
197. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1066-69.
198. Id. at 1067; see also id. at 1068 (stating that it was "persuad[ed] ...that Hoffman
does not resolve the question whether federal courts may award backpay to undocumented
workers who have been discharged in violation of Title VII"); id. at 1074 n. 19 (emphasizing
that "we have serious reservations about [Hoffman Plastic's] applicability" in Title VII
actions).
199. Id. at 1067-69.
200. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's arguments in
his Hoffman Plastic dissent).
201. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1067-69.
202. Id. at 1067; see supraPart II.A (discussing the available remedies under Title VII).
203. Id. at 1067-68 (stating similarly that Congress added the compensatory and punitive
damage remedies "to facilitate the deterrence of discrimination" and that Title VII's
remedies address "instances of discrimination by sending strong messages to would-bediscriminators"); see supra Part II.A (discussing the nature and purposes of the available
remedies under Title VII).
204. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1068; see also id. at 1068-69 (discussing how "'the reasonably
certain prospect of a back pay award ...provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes
employers . . . to endeavor to eliminate . . . the last vestiges of an unfortunate and

ignominious page in this country's history' (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975))).
In addition to addressing this deterrence argument from the perspective of the
employer, the Rivera court appeared to view it from the perspective of the undocumented
worker as well. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit contrasted the NLRA, which is "enforced
primarily" and administratively through the NLRB, with Title VII, which "depends
principally upon private causes of action" to "achieve the deterrent purposes of the statute."
Id. at 1067; see also id. at 1067-68 (stating that "in Title VII, Congress has chosen to rely
heavily on private actions that result in the imposition of severe remedies, including
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congressional "inten[t] to bar the use of one of the most critical of those
remedies [i.e., back pay] in the case of undocumented workers who are
victims of invidious discrimination. 20 5
Moreover, the Rivera court viewed Hoffman Plastic as "not... relevant
to a Title VII action" because it "says nothing regarding a federal court's
power to balance [the] IRCA against Title VII' when fashioning
remedies. 20 6 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit compared the NLRA, which
utilizes a federal administrative agency (the NLRB) to award back pay and
remedial relief, with Title VII, which uses "a federal court [to] decide[]
whether a statutory violation warrants a backpay award. ' 20 7 Stating that
Hoffman Plastic only addressed the NLRB's "remedial discretion to
interpret statutes other than the NLRA," 20 8 the court emphasized that a
federal court still retains "the very authority to interpret both Title VII and
209
[the] IRCA that the NLRB [now] lacks" after Hoffman Plastic.
Having deemed Hoffman Plastic as likely inapplicable to the Title VII
context, the Rivera court did not bar any monetary remedies (including that
of back pay) for undocumented workers under that statute. 2 10 To the
contrary, the Ninth Circuit "seriously doubt[ed]" that undocumented
workers were even barred from "the payment of back wages.. . in Title VII
21
cases." 1

The Ninth Circuit is not the only federal court to have embraced this first
approach of not foreclosing any monetary remedies to undocumented
workers under federal employment discrimination law. Indeed, certain
federal district courts in Illinois 2 12 and New York2 13 have also supported
this approach.
backpay, in order to deter future discrimination and vindicate national policy of the highest
priority"). In light of Title VII's "private" enforcement scheme, the court's presumed point
is that barring certain Title VII remedies for undocumented workers would make these
"private attorneys general" less inclined and less motivated to bring Title VII lawsuits,
thereby frustrating the "deterrent purpose[]" behind Title VII. Id. at 1067; see also id. at
1068-69 (referencing "the importance of private actions to the enforcement scheme and of
backpay to the bringing of private actions").
205. Id. at 1068-69; see also id. at 1069 (suggesting that "the overriding national policy
against discrimination would seem likely to outweigh any bar against the payment of back
wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII cases").
206. Id. at 1068.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 1066-70, 1074-75.
211. Id. at 1069; see also id. at 1066-67 (stating that it "seriously doubt[ed] that Hoffman
is as broadly applicable" so as to preclude "any award of backpay to an illegal immigrant"
under other federal statutes); id. at 1074 (stating that "[w]e seriously doubt that Hoffman's
prohibition of NLRB-authorized back pay awards under the NLRA serves to prohibit a
district court from awarding backpay to a Title VII plaintiff").
212. See De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238-39 (C.D. Ii. 2002) (a
Title VII employment discrimination case viewing Hoffman Plastic as "focused on" the
NLRB's remedial authority and stating that, based on the broader "authority of a federal
court as opposed to the NLRB," it "cannot conclude at this time that Hoffman is dispositive"
as to the remedial rights of undocumented workers to back pay under Title VII).
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C. The Second RemedialApproach:
Foreclosureof Some Monetary Remedies
Under the second remedial approach, undocumented workers are
foreclosed from some of the monetary remedies under the federal
employment discrimination laws. This approach answers the abovereferenced key questions as follows:
(1) Yes-the Supreme Court's Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic
decisions do extend beyond the NLRA context and apply to the
federal employment discrimination law contexts; and
(2) Only certain monetary remedies (namely, back pay and front
pay) are foreclosed to undocumented workers under those laws.
As a result, the first and second remedial approaches differ in two
significant ways: (i) the latter views the Supreme Court's NLRA precedent
as applicable beyond that NLRA context, while the former does not; and (ii)
the latter bars undocumented workers from recovering certain monetary
remedies under the federal employment discrimination laws, while the
former does not.
While the Ninth Circuit's Rivera decision provides an example of the
first remedial approach, a four-member dissent in that case paints an
effective picture of the second approach. 2 14 In this dissent, Judge Carlos
Bea criticized the Rivera court's unwillingness to extend the Supreme
Court's Hoffman Plastic decision to the federal employment discrimination
law contexts. 2 15 In support of the opposite view, the dissent offered two
216
primary points.
First, Judge Bea rejected the Rivera court's position that Hoffman Plastic
merely involved the NLRB's administrative remedial authority under the
NLRA and was not relevant to a federal court's remedial authority under
Title VII. 217 Specifically, the Rivera dissent argued that Hoffman Plastic's
remedial limitations for undocumented workers "[did] not rest upon such a
slender reed" as administrative authority under the NLRA. 2 18 Instead,
Judge Bea more broadly viewed Hoffman Plastic as addressing "the
question [ofi . . . not who can vindicate the rights [of undocumented
213. See Avila-Blum v. Casa De Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (a federal employment discrimination action concluding that the magistrate judge "did
not err in following the reasoning of Rivera and other courts in concluding that Hoffman
Plasticwas limited to actions brought by the NLRB to enforce the [NLRA]").
214. After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rivera, NIBCO petitioned for a rehearing en
banc. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 822 (2004). While the Ninth Circuit denied that
petition, id., Judge Carlos Bea-joined by Judges Alex Kozinski, Andrew Kleinfeld, and
Ronald Gould-filed a dissent to that denial. Id. at 823-35 (Bea, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 830-31.
216. See id. at 830-35.
217. Id. at 832-33 (noting also the Rivera court's view that Hoffman Plastic merely
"stands for the proposition that backpay, frontpay and reinstatement are not available to
plaintiffs suing under the NLRA alone" (emphasis added)).
218. Id. at 834.

2008] IMMIGRATION & EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LA W

147

workers], but what damages can be recovered" by them.2 19 Focusing on
these remedies rather than who awards them, the Rivera dissent stated that
Hoffman Plastic's "same rationale applies here [in a Title VII case]:
allowing federal courts to award backpay to illegal aliens would also
'unduly trench upon' federal immigration policy as codified in the
2 20
IRCA.,,
Second, Judge Bea disputed the Rivera court's contention that limiting
Title VII's "broader remedies" could act as a disincentive for
undocumented workers to "vindicate their workplace rights[,]" thereby
compromising the "national policy against discrimination."' 22 1 Akin to the
Supreme Court's response to a similar argument in Sure-Tan and Hoffman
Plastic,222 the Rivera dissent focused on the still-available remedies under
Title VII and stated that "admirable civil rights policy" would still be
furthered "were the plaintiffs forthrightly to waive only one of their money
claims [i.e., wage loss claims, such as back pay orfront pay], the one based
on a possibly illegal contract, while retaining other money, equitable and
22 3
counselfees' claims."
Having deemed Hoffman Plastic applicable to the Title VII context,
Judge Bea then clarified which monetary remedies were foreclosed to
undocumented workers. Noting that the Rivera court would "grant to
unauthorized aliens suing under Title VII the [monetary] remedies of
backpay [and] frontpay," 224 the dissent reached the opposite conclusion:
"[U]nder the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman, unauthorized aliens are
not entitled to backpay and frontpay damages under Title VII ....225
Symbolic of the second remedial approach, however, the Rivera dissent
did not foreclose all monetary remedies to undocumented workers. Instead,
it stated,

219. Id. at 833.
220. Id. at 835 (quoting Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 151-52) ("More fundamentally,
why should a district court have any greater discretion to fashion remedies for civil rights
violations which 'trench upon federal statutes and policies' unrelated to Title VII (such as
prohibitions on unauthorized aliens working in the U.S.) than does the NLRB?").
221. Id. at 828, 831, 834.
222. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Sure-Tan Court's
response on this issue); supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Hoffman
PlasticCourt's response on this issue).
223. Rivera, 384 F.3d at 823 (emphasis added); see also id. at 828 (stating that
"'[u]nchilled' but unauthorized aliens are not only entitled to, but have sought emotional
distress damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees under Title VII ...and have, in fact,
sought to vindicate their workplace rights"); id. at 835 (stating that courts can "still award
remedies to vindicate Title VII rights such as (1) emotional distress [compensatory]
damages, (2) punitive damages, and (3) attorneys' fees").
224. Id. at 830-31.
225. Id. at 826; see also id. at 823 (referencing Hoffman Plastic and stating that the
plaintiffs-who "do not have authorized immigration status"-are "not entitled [under Title
VII] to be awarded back wages or wages they might have earned in the future"); id. at 835
(proposing that courts should "not allow[] unauthorized aliens to work or to recover wage
loss damages for work time loss").
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court[s] can still award remedies to vindicate Title VII rights, such as (1)
emotional distress [compensatory] damages, (2) punitive damages, and (3)
attorneys' fees, all without 'trenching upon' the IRCA policy of not
allowing unauthorized aliens to work or to recover wage loss damagesfor
work time loss in jobs to which they had no legal right[s].226

Thus, the Rivera dissent differentiated between foreclosed remedies and
preserved remedies based on a particular remedy's implicit connection to
such "wage loss damages for work time loss in jobs to which [these
workers] had no legal right[s]" 227-or, stated differently, to "back wages or
wages they might have earned in the future from... job[s] which they were
incapable of holding, under our Immigration laws."'228
Another example of the second approach is an Illinois federal district
court's decision in Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc. 229 In Renteria, the district
court confronted a FLSA retaliation claim by employees who had been
terminated after joining an overtime compensation lawsuit. 230 These
employees requested the complete gamut of FLSA monetary remedies for
retaliation claims-namely, back pay, front pay (in lieu of reinstatement),
and liquidated damages. 23 1 At summary judgment, the employer contended
that, in light of Hoffman Plastic, the employees were "not entitled to back
pay, front pay, or [liquidated] damages because they were not legally
'232
authorized to work in the United States.
The court granted summary judgment as to some, but not all, of these
FLSA monetary remedies. 233 The court did not even question whether
Hoffman Plastic extended beyond the NLRA context and applied to the
employees' FLSA retaliation claim. 234 Instead, it simply discussed, and
thus presumed, Hoffman Plastic's applicability to monetary remedies in this
235
FLSA retaliation context.
Next, the court addressed which of these monetary remedies were
foreclosed to undocumented workers under the FLSA's retaliation

226. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 823; see also id. at 833 (stating that "explicit congressional policy prohibit[s]
payment of wage loss damages to anyone who lacks the immigration status or nationality to
have a legal right to earn the wages claimed to have been lost").
229. No. 02-C-495, 2003 WL 21995190 (N.D. Il1.Aug. 21, 2003).
230. Id. at * 1; see supra note 181 (discussing the FLSA's retaliation provision).
231. Renteria, 2003 WL 21995190, at *4, 6. In discussing the requested and available
remedies for the FLSA retaliation claim, the Renteria court appeared to use interchangeably
the terms "liquidated damages" and "compensatory damages." See id. Because the FLSA
expressly provides for the former and not the latter, see supra notes 183-84 and
accompanying text (discussing the available remedies under the FLSA's retaliation
provision), the term "liquidated damages" will be substituted and used in discussing the
Renteria decision.
232. Renteria, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6.
233. Id. at *6, 10.
234. See id. at *6.
235. See id.
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provision. 236 Specifically, the court decided that "claims for back pay and
front pay are stricken." 237 But, like the Rivera dissent, the court did not bar
all monetary remedies to undocumented workers for these claims; instead, it
"agree[d] with . . . the point-that [liquidated] damages for retaliatory
termination under the FLSA remain available to undocumented
238
workers."
Similar to the Rivera dissent, the Renteria court distinguished between
back pay and front pay (as foreclosed monetary remedies) and liquidated
damages (as a preserved monetary remedy) based on whether a particular
remedy implicitly "assume[d]" work that was "against the law":
[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that awarding back pay to
undocumented aliens contravenes the policies embodied in [the IRCA].
An award of front pay would be inappropriate for the same reason: front
pay essentially assumes that the worker will continue to work for the
employer in the future, which is against the law for an undocumented
alien. We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding [liquidated]
damages. ... The remedy of [liquidated] damages, unlike those of back
worker's continued
pay and front pay, does not assume the undocumented
239
(and illegal) employment by the employer.

Beyond the Rivera dissent and Renteria court, other federal district courts

24 3
24 1
and Texas 24 4- New York, 24 2 Oklahoma,
in Illinois, 240 Minnesota,

236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The court thus concluded that the "claim for [liquidated] damages remains for
trial." Id.
239. Id. (emphasis added) (also noting that "the Supreme Court did not preclude the
NLRB from taking any remedial action for the employer's improper firing of an
undocumented worker" (emphasis added)).
240. See EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (a federal
employment discrimination case implicitly embracing the second remedial approach by
noting that "the immigration status of the charging parties is not relevant to the claims or
defenses in this case" because they "are not seeking front pay, back pay, lost wages or
benefits").
241. See EEOC v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1086-88 (D. Minn. 2006) (a Title VII
discrimination and retaliation case implicitly embracing the second remedial approach by
noting that "a Title VII plaintiffs immigration status may be relevant to the determination of
appropriate remedies" and questioning the relevance of such status when the EEOC and the
former employee had "not... assert[ed] claims for back pay, front pay, or reinstatement");
see also EEOC v. Rest. Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007) (the same Title VII
discrimination and retaliation case, again implicitly embracing the second remedial approach
by stating that "[i]t is possible that Hoffman Plastic precludes undocumented employees
from pursuing certain remedies in discrimination cases").
242. See EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03-CV-4990, 2007 WL 586720, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (a Title VII discrimination and retaliation case implicitly
embracing the second remedial approach by stating that a plaintiffs immigration status is
"relevant to damages in an employment discrimination action"); cf Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd.,
No. 01-CIV-10010, 2002 WL 1941484, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) (an ADA
discrimination action implicitly identifying the second and third remedial approaches by
noting the relevant "question of whether Hoffman Plastic[] applies only to awards of
backpay and reinstatement or whether it similarly precludes illegal immigrants from
bringing suits for punitive and compensatory damages" (emphasis added)). In Lopez v.
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plus the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (as the federal
administrative agency that enforces Title VII, the ADA, and the
ADEA) 245-have embraced this second remedial approach.
Superflex, Ltd., the plaintiff had, in light of the Hoffman Plastic decision, withdrawn claims
for back pay and reinstatement remedies, thereby leaving claims for compensatory damages
and punitive damages. Id. at * 1-2.
243. See Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277-78, 1280, 1286-88
(N.D. Okla. 2006) (a Title VII discrimination and FLSA case expressly embracing the
second remedial approach by (i) stating that Hoffman Plastic "may preclude an award of
back pay" and (ii) allowing, rather than foreclosing, the plaintiffs to recover the monetary
remedies of compensatory and punitive damages (under Title VII) and liquidated damages
(under the FLSA)).
244. See Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (a
Title VII discrimination and retaliation case expressly embracing the second remedial
approach by stating that Hoffman Plastic "compels the conclusion that Escobar is not
entitled to back pay on his claims under Title VII ...

[because] such a remedy ...

[is]

foreclosed by the fact that he was an undocumented worker at the time he was employed by
Spartan"). Enrique Escobar had "concede[d] that he [was] not, given the Supreme Court's
decision in [Hoffman Plastic,] entitled to some of the remedies afforded by Title VII, most
particularly back pay." Id. at 896. The Escobar court, however, did question Hoffman
Plastic's applicability to a reinstatement (and front pay) remedy when the undocumented
worker has subsequently obtained "legal work status in the United States." Id. at 897.
Interestingly, despite the Ninth Circuit's Rivera opinion, which embraced the first
remedial approach, certain district courts within the Ninth Circuit-namely, in California
and Washington-appear to have embraced the second remedial approach. See Perez-Farias
v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. CV-05-3061-MWL, 2007 WL 1412796, at *3 & n.2 (E.D.
Wash. May 10, 2007) (a post-Rivera federal and state employment discrimination case
stating that the "immigration status of the class members is relevant to a determination of
damages" and suggesting "deductions from the aggregate award backpay for any plaintiff
who failed to prove eligibility"); Romero v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. C05-03014 MJJ, 2007
WL 518987, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (a post-Rivera 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action citing
both Hoffman Plastic and Rivera, but rejecting plaintiffs argument based on Rivera and
finding that "immigration status" was "relevant to plaintiff's claim for past and future wage
loss damages"); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (a pre-Rivera retaliation case under the FLSA stating that "Hoffman eliminated
back pay as a remedy available to undocumented workers" but "declin[ing] to extend
Hoffman to bar the remedies that plaintiff seeks"--namely, compensatory and punitive
damages).
245. Before Hoffman Plastic,the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)'s
official position reflected the first remedial approach-specifically, that "unauthorized
workers who are subject[] to unlawful employment discrimination are entitled to the same
relief as other victims of discrimination" under the applicable law(s). EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
TO
OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS: EEOC

Intro.
(Oct.
26,
1999),
available
at
NOTICE
No.
915.002
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html (rescinded June 27, 2002).
Three months after Hoffman Plastic, the EEOC rescinded its 1999 Enforcement
Guidance. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, RESCISSION OF ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS: EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL No. 915.002 (June

27, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html. The EEOC
subsequently embraced the second remedial approach, by viewing some, but not all,
monetary remedies to be foreclosed to undocumented workers under the federal employment
discrimination laws. See Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC
Reaffirms Commitment to Protecting Undocumented Workers from DiscriminationCommission Rescinds Prior Guidance, Issues Charge Processing Instructions (June 28,
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D. The Third Remedial Approach:
ForeclosureofAll Monetary Remedies

Under the third and final remedial approach, undocumented workers are
foreclosed from all monetary remedies under the federal employment
discrimination laws. This approach provides the following answers to the
above-referenced key questions on this issue:
(1) Yes-the Supreme Court's Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic
decisions extend beyond the NLRA context and apply to the
federal employment discrimination law contexts; and
(2) All monetary remedies (including, but not limited to, back pay
and front pay) are foreclosed to undocumented workers under those
laws.
Thus, like the second remedial approach, this third approach views the
Supreme Court's NLRA precedent as applicable beyond the NLRA context.
But, distinct from the first two remedial approaches, the third approach bars
undocumented workers from recovering any and all monetary remedies
under the federal employment discrimination laws.
Judicial examples of the third remedial approach are, at best, sparse.
However, the New Jersey Superior Court's decision in Crespo v. Evergo
Corp.246 nicely reflects this third approach, albeit in a state employment
discrimination law context. In Crespo, the appellate court confronted a
state employment discrimination claim (under New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination (LAD)) 247 by an undocumented worker who had been

(referencing EEOC
2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-28-02.html
Commissioner Leslie E. Silverman's statement that "Hoffman affects the availability of some
forms of relief to undocumented workers" and EEOC Vice Chair Paul M. Igasaki's
statement that "Hoffman may affect a person's eligibility to receive some forms of relief').
Consistent with that new position, the EEOC "directed its field offices that
[undocumented worker] claims for allforms of relief other than reinstatementand backpay
for periods after discharge or failure to hire, should be processed in accord with existing
Similarly, when litigating federal employment
Id. (emphasis added).
standards."
discrimination cases on behalf of undocumented workers, the EEOC has consistently opted
to not pursue back pay, front pay, and/or reinstatement remedies. See, e.g., Rest. Co., 448 F.
Supp. 2d at 1086 (a Title VII discrimination and retaliation case noting that the EEOC and
the former employee "are not ... asserting claims for back pay, front pay, or
reinstatement"); Chellen, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (a Title VII discrimination and FLSA case
noting that "[tihe EEOC is not seeking backpay for the time subsequent to the Chellen
plaintiffs' work" at their former employer); Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. at 583 (a federal
employment discrimination case noting that the EEOC and the former employees were "not
seeking front pay, back pay, lost wages or benefits").
246. 841 A.2d 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
247. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 5-42 (West 2007). New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination (LAD) prohibits, inter alia, employment-based discrimination against any
person because of "race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, disability, nationality, sex, gender identity or
expression or source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments." Id. § 10:5-4.
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terminated after taking maternity leave. 248 In her claim, Rosa Crespo had
requested full monetary remedies under the LAD-namely, "economic
damages (back pay, front pay, and lost benefits)" in addition to "noneconomic damages (emotional distress damages, punitive damages and
counsel fees). ' 2 49 The trial court-embracing the second remedial
approach of foreclosing only some monetary remedies-had granted
summary judgment to Evergo Corp. as to Crespo's "economic damages"
250
but not as to her "non-economic damages."
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed and remanded for
"dismissal of the entire complaint[,]" 25 1 because it viewed Crespo as being
barred from all monetary damages under the LAD. 252 Like the Renteria
court, the court did not even question whether Hoffman Plastic extended
beyond the NLRA context and applied to Crespo's LAD claim. 253 Rather,
the court merely discussed Hoffman Plastic, noted that decision's "strong
enforcement of the policies served by [the] ICRA [sic]," 254 and thus

255
presumed its applicability to monetary remedies in the LAD context.
The court then tackled which monetary remedies were foreclosed to
undocumented workers under the LAD. 256
Specifically, the court
concluded that Crespo was "preclude[d from] both economic and noneconomic damages she claims [to have] resulted from the termination of
'257
[her] employment.
The court's rationale for foreclosing all monetary remedies under the
LAD was that "legal employment" constituted a "prerequisite" to such
remedies under the LAD. 258 Highlighting Crespo's "disqualification from
legal employment" and "the illegality of [that] employment, '259 the court

248. Crespo, 841 A.2d at 472-73. In order to obtain her employment with Evergo Corp.,
Rosa Crespo had presented a fraudulent social security card and represented that she was
"legally entitled to work in the United States." Id. at 473.
249. Id. at 472. Under the LAD, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover "[a]ll
remedies available in common law tort actions," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13, in addition to a
"reasonable attorney's fee," id. § 10:5-27.1.
250. Crespo, 841 A.2d at 472.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 473.
253. See id. at 474-77.
254. Id. at 477.
255. See id. at 474-77.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 477; see also id. at 476 (concluding that Crespo's "termination damages, both
economic and non-economic damages," under the LAD were precluded).
258. Id.

259. Id. at 476-77 (also referencing Crespo's "statutory bar" and "[c]ongressionally
mandated disqualification"). Interestingly, the court referenced a possible exception to
foreclosing all monetary remedies to undocumented workers under the LAD. See id.
Specifically, it suggested that "egregious circumstances" (such as "'aggravated sexual
harassment"') could trigger sufficient need 'to vindicate the policies of the LAD ... and to
compensate... tangible physical or emotional harm' and thus warrant preserving remedial
relief for undocumented workers under the LAD. Id. (citing and discussing Cedeno v.
Montclair State Univ., 750 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2000)). The court found no such "egregious
circumstances" in Crespo. Id. at 477.
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saw "no basis for distinguishing . . . non-economic damages" (such as

emotional distress damages and punitive damages) from "economic
damages" (such as back 260
pay and front pay) for purposes of remedy
foreclosure under the LAD.

Finally, it is worth noting that some jurisdictions appear to use a "partial
version" of the third remedial approach: they reach the same end (i.e.,
foreclosing all monetary remedies to undocumented workers under the
federal employment discrimination laws), but via different means.
Specifically, these jurisdictions conclude that an undocumented worker
does not even meet the "qualified for the position" element of a prima facie
case for federal employment discrimination claims. 26 1 Because the
undocumented worker's prima facie case is found lacking in the first place,
these courts have no need to rely upon, or extend the applicability of, the
Supreme Court's NLRA precedent in order to reach the same result of
comprehensive remedial foreclosure.
This version of the third approach is illustrated by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries,
Inc.2 6 2

In Egbuna, the Fourth Circuit faced a Title VII retaliation claim by
Obiora E. Egbuna, an undocumented worker who had not been rehired after
he had corroborated certain claims in another employee's discrimination
lawsuit against Time-Life. 263

Granting summary judgment to Time-Life,

the district court reasoned that Egbuna's undocumented status rendered him
"unqualified for the position . . . sought" and thus precluded him from
2 64

establishing even a prima facie case of discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 2 65 The court concluded that Egbuna was
entirely "ineligible ... for the remedies he [sought]" under Title VII. 26 6 Its
rationale for foreclosing all Title VII monetary remedies rested on two
bases. First, the Fourth Circuit focused upon a Title VII plaintiffs need to
prove his or her "qualification" for the position as part of the requisite

prima facie case:
260. Id.at 473.
261. See infra notes 262-79 and accompanying text (discussing illustrative U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit precedent). In order to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that: (i) he or she "belongs" to a
protected group or class; (ii) he or she "applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants"; (iii) he or she was "rejected" or otherwise subject to
adverse employment action; and (iv) "the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
262. 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
263. Id. at 185-86. At the time of his initial hire in June 1989, Obiora E. Egbuna
possessed a valid student work visa and was thus not an undocumented worker. Id. at 185.
However, that visa expired six months into his employment with Time-Life, and he never
renewed it. Id. at 185-86. Consequently, Egbuna was an undocumented worker for the
balance of his employment with Time-Life (which ended with his resignation in April 1993)
and at the time Time-Life refused to rehire him in June 1993. Id. at 185-86, 186 n.4.
264. Id. at 186.
265. Id. at 188.
266. Id. at 186.
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A plaintiff is entitled to [Title VII's] remedies only upon a successful
showing that the applicant was qualified for employment. When the
applicant is an alien, being "qualified" for the position is not determined
by the applicant's capacity to perform the job--rather, it is determined by
whether the applicant was an alien authorized for employment in the
United States at the time in question. Congress so declared in the...
[IRCA].

any undocumented alien
...
[The] IRCA thus statutorily disqualifies
267
from being employed as a matter of law.
Consequently, the court viewed Egbuna-whose undocumented status was
undisputed-as "statutorily disqualified from employment in the United
States" 268 and as thus having "no cause of action" or available remedies
2 69
under Title VII.
Second, and from more of a policy perspective, the Fourth Circuit viewed
a contrary decision that would allow Egbuna to proceed with, and recover
monetary remedies under, his Title VII claim as: (i) "sanction[ing] the
formation of a statutorily declared illegal relationship"; (ii) "illogically
creat[ing] an entitlement simply because Egbuna applied for a job despite
his ... having been statutorily disqualified from employment in the United
States"; and (iii) "nullify[ing the] IRCA, which declares it illegal to hire or
270
to continue to employ unauthorized aliens."
In dissent, Judge Samuel James Ervin-foreshadowing the arguments
that Justice Breyer would make four years later in his Hoffman Plastic
dissent 27 1 --contended that the Egbuna court's approach significantly
compromised the purposes and policies of both federal employment
discrimination law and federal immigration law. 2 72 As to the former, the

267. Id. at 187.
268. Id. at 188.
269. Id. at 186.
270. Id. at 188. The Fourth Circuit decided Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc. almost
four years before the Supreme Court's 2002 Hoffman Plastic decision. In the past six years
since Hoffman Plastic, the Fourth Circuit does not appear to have substantively discussed
either Egbuna or Hoffman Plastic in the context of an undocumented worker's rightsremedial or otherwise-under the federal employment discrimination laws.
There are other pre-Hoffman Plastic cases from the Fourth Circuit that evidence the
partial version of the third remedial approach. See Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp., 186 F.3d
502, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Egbuna in a Title VII and ADEA claim for an alleged
discriminatory and retaliatory failure to transfer and concluding that the plaintiffs
undocumented worker status rendered him "not qualified for employment" and "ineligible
for Title VII protection" and "ADEA protection"); Reyes-Gaona v. N. C. Growers Ass'n,
250 F.3d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Egbuna in an ADEA claim for an alleged
discriminatory refusal to hire and stating that, for "a foreign national to be 'qualified' for a
position, he must be authorized for employment in the United States at the time in
question").
271. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's arguments in
his Hoffman Plastic dissent).
272. Egbuna, 153 F.3d at 188-90 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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dissent stated that the majority's decision precluded undocumented workers
2 73
from "ever prov[ing] a prima facie case of employment discrimination"
and thus insulated employers from "be[ing] held accountable under Title
274
VII for adverse employment actions taken against undocumented aliens."
This result, said Judge Ervin, "defeat[ed] Congress's desire to eradicate
employment discrimination" 275 and "fail[ed] to effectuate the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII."27 6

As to the latter, the dissent argued that, under the majority's approach,
employers would also have "an economic incentive to hire undocumented
workers" because those workers could not bring viable claims under the
federal employment discrimination laws, such as Title VII. 277 By creating
this incentive, said Judge Ervin, the Egbuna decision actually "work[ed]
against [the] IRCA's goal of curtailing illegal immigration" 278 and was
"contrary" to "the immigration policy Congress sought to advance through
[the] IRCA.

' '279

III. PROPOSING A UNIFORM REMEDIAL APPROACH FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

As evidenced by the three different remedial approaches, there is no
uniform judicial philosophy regarding the monetary remedial rights of
undocumented workers under the federal employment discrimination laws.
As a result, an undocumented worker's remedial rights (and an employer's
accompanying remedial liabilities) under Title VII, the ADA, and/or the
ADEA are jurisdiction-dependent.
For example, assume that Shirley, Earl, and Sandee are all undocumented
workers who work for Lemon Corp. but in different federal jurisdictions:
(i) Shirley works in a jurisdiction following the first remedial approach; (ii)
Earl works in one following the second approach; and (iii) Sandee works in
If Lemon Corp.
a jurisdiction following the third approach.
discriminatorily discharges each of these workers because of the same
protected trait under federal employment discrimination law, then: (i)
Shirley is able to recover (and Lemon Corp. must pay) all available
monetary damages; (ii) Earl is able to recover (and Lemon Corp. must pay)
only some of those damages; and (iii) Sandee is able to recover (and Lemon
Corp. must pay) none of those damages.

273. Id. at 188.
274. Id; see also id. at 189 (stating that "[t]he majority's decision, in effect, relieves
employers of their obligation to comply with federal employment laws, other than penalties
under [the] IRCA, with regard to any undocumented workers they might employ").
275. Id. at 188.

276. Id. at 189; see also id. at 190 (stating that the majority's decision is "contrary" to
"the anti-discrimination aims of Title VII").
277. Id. at 189.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 190.
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The new approach proposed in this Article-the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach-will bring federal uniformity to the monetary remedial rights of
undocumented workers under the federal employment discrimination laws.
This approach represents a balanced "middle ground" that is consistent
with: (i) the IRCA and its underlying congressional philosophy; (ii) the
Supreme Court's NLRA precedent; and (iii) the important purposes and
policies of both federal employment discrimination law and federal
immigration law.
A. The ConditionalForeclosureApproach and Its Two Features
The Conditional Foreclosure Approach contains two distinct features for
determining the extent, if any, of monetary remedial foreclosure for
undocumented workers under Title VII, the ADA, and/or the ADEA. These
two features are:
(1) "Disqualifying Condition." As a condition to the limited
remedy foreclosure described in (2)(a), the undocumented worker
must have violated the IRCA's employee-specific provisions that
prohibit fraudulent conduct in the employment and hiring
processes, with the employer thus having satisfied the IRCA's
employer-specific requirements as to these processes; and
(2) "Limited Remedy Foreclosure." Under the federal employment
discrimination laws, an undocumented worker:
(a) is foreclosed from (and does not retain) the monetary
remedial rights to back pay and front pay; but
(b) is not foreclosed from (and does retain) all other monetary
remedial rights, including, but not limited to, rights to
compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidated damages,
and reasonable attorneys' fees.
This new approach represents several significant departures from the
current remedial approaches. First, unlike any of the three approaches, the
Conditional Foreclosure Approach-via its disqualifying condition
feature-expressly forecloses limited forms of monetary relief if and only if
the undocumented worker engaged in IRCA-prohibited fraudulent conduct
in obtaining employment in the United States (with the employer having
fulfilled its IRCA employment and hiring-related obligations).
Second, this new approach-unlike the second and third approacheswould afford certain undocumented workers (i.e., those who do not engage
in prohibited fraudulent conduct to obtain employment and thus fall outside
the disqualifying condition) full and complete monetary remedies, including
back pay and front pay, under the federal employment discrimination
280
laws.
280. For example, suppose Ann is an undocumented worker. During its interviewing and
hiring process, Collins Corp. fails to abide by its employer-specific IRCA responsibilities-
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Finally, and unlike the third approach, the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach-via its limited remedy foreclosure feature-preserves, and does
not bar under any circumstances whatsoever, an undocumented worker's
rights to any and all monetary remedies other than back pay and front pay.
As a result, an undocumented worker who prevails in a Title VII, ADA,
and/or ADEA lawsuit could recover, as applicable and at a minimum, the
significant remedies of compensatory damages, punitive damages,
liquidated damages, and/or attorneys' fees.
B. Defending the "DisqualifyingCondition "Feature
The first feature of the Conditional Foreclosure Approach is its unique
disqualifying condition as to back pay and front pay remedies. This feature
is consistent with the IRCA and its underlying congressional philosophy,
rests on the implicit, if not explicit, foundation of the Supreme Court's
Hoffman Plastic decision, and promotes employer IRCA compliance and
federal immigration policy.
1. The IRCA and Its Underlying Congressional Philosophy
The disqualifying condition feature is wholly consistent with the IRCA's
express terms and the two-part congressional philosophy reflected therein.
This two-part philosophy includes: (i) the view that undocumented workers
who obtain employment via certain prohibited, fraudulent means are to be
subject to negative consequence or sanction; and (ii) the view that all other
undocumented workers, who merely obtain employment in the United
States but not via such prohibited means, are not to be subject to that
consequence or sanction.
As to the first view, when enacting the IRCA's "comprehensive scheme"
to "combat[]" the employment of undocumented workers, 8 1 Congress
created prohibitions and penalties applicable to both employers and
undocumented workers. While the IRCA's "principal means of...
curtailing future illegal immigration" was, indeed, to subject noncompliant

namely, obtaining the requisite 1-9 supporting documents to establish Ann's identity and
authorization to work in the United States. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text
(discussing the IRCA's "employment verification system" responsibilities for employers).
Ann can thus become employed by Collins Corp. without having tendered any fraudulent
materials in violation of the employee-specific prohibitions of the IRCA. See supra notes
44-47 and accompanying text (discussing the IRCA's employee-specific prohibitions and
civil and criminal sanctions).
If Collins Corp. subsequently discriminates against Ann in violation of Title VII, the
ADA, and/or the ADEA and she prevails in her lawsuit, the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach would afford her the full panoply of monetary remedies under the applicable
law(s), because the disqualifying condition would not have been satisfied.
281. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
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employers to stiff civil and/or criminal penalties, 28 2 Congress also opted to
283
take a strong stance against undocumented workers.
Specifically, the IRCA purposefully subjects undocumented workers to
criminal fines, criminal prosecution and imprisonment, and/or additional
civil fines (as applicable), provided that they either (i) use a "false" or non"lawfully issued" identification document (in conjunction with an
employer's IRCA employment verification system) or (ii) falsely attest to
eligibility and work authorization. 284 Importantly, the IRCA thus reflects a
congressionally created condition to negative consequences for
undocumented workers-namely, engaging in IRCA-prohibited, fraudulent
misconduct as part of the employment and hiring processes.
As to the second view, Congress went no further than this subset of
undocumented workers for purposes of IRCA prohibition and sanction.
More specifically, and despite an undocumented worker's illegal entry into
the country, the IRCA's employment provisions do not prohibit that worker
from (or impose criminal and/or civil sanctions for) the mere act of
becoming, or being, employed in the United States. 285 Consequently, when
an undocumented worker is simply able to obtain employment without
having used IRCA-prohibited, fraudulent means (i.e., because the employer
failed to request any identity and work authorization documents in the first
place), that worker is viewed as "off-limits" by Congress for purposes of
IRCA penalty and sanction.
Thus, the IRCA's express terms and framework reflect a purposeful
intent by Congress to differentiate, and to place into two separate groups,
undocumented workers for purposes of sanction-those who engage in
IRCA-prohibited, fraudulent conduct, and those who do not. The IRCA's
negative consequences for undocumented workers do not spring
automatically from the simple fact of employment, but conditionally from
these more culpable facts of "employment process" misconduct.
This disqualifying condition feature reflects the first part of Congress's
two-part IRCA philosophy-namely, the view that negative consequences
or sanctions are to apply to undocumented workers who obtain employment
via prohibited, fraudulent means.
Under the IRCA, the negative
consequences are in the form of criminal and/or civil sanctions. Under the
Conditional Foreclosure Approach, of course, the negative consequences

282. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5650.
283. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing the IRCA provisions
applicable to undocumented workers).
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2000); H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 62, reprintedin 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5666 (noting that the IRCA was to provide "serious criminal penalties" as
to undocumented workers when "fraudulent documents are utilized"); supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text (discussing the IRCA's employee-specific prohibitions and applicable
civil and criminal sanctions).
285. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of IRCA
prohibition and sanction against undocumented workers for merely being employed).
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are in the form of foreclosure of back pay and front pay remedies under the
federal employment discrimination laws.
More importantly, however, is the applicable scope of the disqualifying
condition feature-it expressly applies only to the subset of undocumented
workers who "have violated the IRCA's employee-specific provisions that
prohibit fraudulent conduct in the employment and hiring processes. 2 86 As
a result, the subset that Congress carved out for IRCA sanction is the exact
same subset that is carved out for limited remedial foreclosure per the
disqualifying condition feature. Put differently, the congressionally created
condition that leads to negative IRCA consequence (i.e., fraudulent conduct
in the employment and hiring processes) is the same as the disqualifying
condition that leads to negative remedial consequence under the
Conditional Foreclosure Approach.
Next, the disqualifying condition feature also embraces the second part of
Congress's IRCA philosophy-namely, the view that negative consequence
or sanction should not extend to all other undocumented workers who
merely obtain employment, but not via prohibited, fraudulent means. By its
very terms, the disqualifying condition does not trigger if the undocumented
worker has simply become employed or is employed in the United States,
without engaging in any IRCA-prohibited "employment process"
misconduct. Thus, again, the subset of undocumented workers that
Congress labeled as "off-limits" for purposes of IRCA sanction is the
precise subset that is "off-limits" for purposes of remedial foreclosure
under the Conditional Foreclosure Approach.
2. The Supreme Court's Hoffman Plastic Decision
In addition, the disqualifying condition feature of the Conditional
Foreclosure Approach is also supported by the Supreme Court's Hoffman
Plastic decision.
At superficial glance, the Hoffman Plastic holding-namely, that an
NLRA back pay award "to an undocumented alien who has never been
legally authorized to work in the United States" is "foreclosed by federal
immigration policy [and the IRCA]" 287-may appear at odds with the
disqualifying condition. After all, this holding could be viewed as
foreclosing back pay relief on a much broader scale-namely, to almost all
undocumented workers (i.e., those who have "never been legally authorized
to work" in this country), rather than the smaller subset who would be
barred from such relief via the disqualifying condition.
However, a close and measured review of the Hoffman Plastic decision
shows that it was the undocumented worker's (Castro's) undisputed

286. See supra Part III.A (outlining the disqualifying condition feature); supra notes 4447 and accompanying text (discussing the IRCA provisions and prohibitions applicable to
employees).
287. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
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fraudulent conduct 2 88-not his mere employment in this country or sheer
undocumented worker status-that served as the implicit, if not explicit,
foundation of the Court's decision. In Hoffman Plastic, the Court analyzed
precisely how Castro's NLRA back pay remedy "trenche[d] upon" both the
express terms and policies embodied in the IRCA. 2 89 In analyzing this
"how" question, the Court visibly relied upon one overwhelming factorCastro's IRCA-prohibited, fraudulent conduct.
For example, in explaining how a back pay remedy for Castro would
"trench upon" the express terms of the IRCA, the Court stressed that
"Castro's use of false documents to obtain employment ... violated [the]
provisions" 290 that "made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain
employment with false documents." 29 1 Repeatedly underscoring Castro's
unlawful conduct, the Court viewed his actions as "misconduct that
render[ed] an underlying employment relationship illegal under explicit
provisions of federal law."2 92 As a result, the Court concluded that the
NLRB's back pay remedy for Castro "discount[ed] the misconduct of
illegal alien employees" under the IRCA and thereby "subvert[ed]" and
2 93
"trivialize[d]" the express terms of "the immigration laws."
Similarly, in explaining how a back pay remedy for Castro would "trench
upon" the policies of the IRCA, the Court again made repeated references
to Castro's prohibited, fraudulent conduct.
For instance, the Court
commented that permitting NLRA back pay awards to undocumented
workers such as Castro would serve as an inducement to "remain[] inside
the United States illegally" 294 and would thus "encourage" future, "new
IRCA violations . . . by [those workers] tendering false documents to
employers." 295 In similar reference to undocumented workers such as
Castro, who had tendered fraudulent documents in his hiring process, the
Court stated that the NLRB's back pay remedy would: (i) "condone prior
violations of the immigration laws" by these workers; 296 (ii) "discount[] the

288. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing Castro's fraudulent use of "a
birth certificate belonging to a friend who was born in Texas" in order to gain employment
with Hoffman Plastic).
289. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 147-52.
290. Id. at 148.
291. Id. at 149.

292. Id. at 146 (emphasis added); see also id. at 143 (discussing NLRA precedent where
the Court had set aside back pay or reinstatement remedies to employees who were "found
guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment" or who "themselves
had committed serious criminal acts"); id. at 149 (stating that Castro's job had been
"obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud"); id. at 151 n.5 (noting that the IRCA
"expressly criminalizes the ... employment relationship at issue in this case").
293. Id. at 150.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 151.
296. Id.
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misconduct of illegal alien employees;" 297 and (iii) encourage them to
"remain[] in the United States illegally, and continue[] to work illegally." 298
Consequently, not only did the Hoffman Plastic Court's foreclosure of
the back pay remedy for undocumented workers involve the factual context
of a worker who had engaged in IRCA-prohibited conduct, but that
misconduct also formed the legal foundation of that foreclosure. The
Court's reliance on this foundation was necessary, in light of the IRCA's
express terms. Those terms, as discussed above, do not prohibit or sanction
an undocumented worker's mere employment in the United States. As a
result, an undocumented worker can "trench upon" the IRCA's express
terms only if he or she uses prohibited, fraudulent means in obtaining
employment in the United States. To view the Hoffman Plastic holding as
applicable to all undocumented workers (rather than this narrower subset) is
to overlook both the IRCA's express terms and the Court's "trench upon"
analysis.
Akin to its consistency with the IRCA's framework and philosophy, the
disqualifying condition feature nicely reflects this foundation of the
Hoffman Plastic decision. Just as Castro's IRCA-prohibited, fraudulent
conduct was the basis used by the Supreme Court to trigger back pay
foreclosure, this same misconduct by undocumented workers is the express
basis used by the disqualifying condition feature to trigger the limited
remedy foreclosure of the Conditional Foreclosure Approach. Thus, by
similarly viewing an undocumented worker's "employment process"
misconduct as the key to monetary remedy foreclosure, both the Hoffman
Plastic decision and the disqualifying condition feature apply to the same,
narrow subset of undocumented workers.
3. Promoting IRCA Compliance and Federal Immigration Policy
Finally, the disqualifying condition feature of the Conditional
Foreclosure Approach creates a significant financial incentive for
employers to comply fully with IRCA obligations, thereby advancing
federal immigration policy.
When it passed the IRCA in 1986, Congress viewed employment in the
United States to be both the "back door on illegal immigration" and "the
magnet that attracts aliens here illegally." 299 As a result, Congress made
"combating [such] employment of illegal aliens central to '[t]he policy of
immigration law."' 300 Importantly, and as mentioned above, Congress
created the IRCA's employer-based requirements, prohibitions, and

297. Id. at 150.
298. Id. at 149.
299. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5650.
300. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 147 (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights,
Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8 (1991)).
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sanctions as "the principal means of closing 30the
back door" 30 1 and
2
magnet.
this
of
force"
"diminish[ing] the attractive
In evaluating how the Conditional Foreclosure Approach furthers these
policies, it is important initially to understand that the concepts of a
worker's IRCA fraudulent conduct and an employer's IRCA compliance
are manifestly connected. In other words: (i) if an employer complies with
its IRCA "employment verification system" obligations (i.e., by obtaining,
and verifying, the requisite identity and work authorization documents),
then an undocumented worker who becomes employed must have done so
via use offalse or fraudulent documents; and (ii) if an employer does not
comply with these IRCA obligations, then an undocumented worker who
becomes employed was able to do so without any use offalse or fraudulent
303
documents.
By referencing (i) the undocumented worker's violation of the IRCA's
"employee-specific provisions" regarding fraudulent conduct in the
employment and hiring processes and (ii) the employer's satisfaction of the
IRCA's "employer-specific requirements" as to these processes, the
disqualifying condition feature recognizes this connected relationship.
Indeed, the Conditional Foreclosure Approach, in effect, issues the
following notice to employers:
EMPLOYERS BEWARE:

IF YOU ARE SUED BY AN UNDOCUMENTED

WORKER UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW,
THEN:
(A) THAT WORKER CAN RECOVER BACK PAY AND FRONT PAY
REMEDIES IF HE OR SHE OBTAINED EMPLOYMENT FREE OF
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT BECAUSE YOU DID NOT COMPLY WITH
YOUR IRCA OBLIGATIONS; AND
(B) THAT WORKER CANNOT RECOVER BACK PAY AND FRONT
PAY REMEDIES IF HE OR SHE RESORTED TO OBTAINING
EMPLOYMENT VIA FRAUDULENT CONDUCT BECAUSE YOU DID
COMPLY WITH YOUR IR CA OBLIGATIONS.

Thus, the employer's financial incentive via the disqualifying condition
feature is conceptually clear: compliance with IRCA responsibilities equals
301. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5650 (also
noting that "the Committee remains convinced that legislation containing employer sanctions
is the most ...effective way to respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens").
302. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
303. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized this relationship between undocumented worker
(mis)conduct and employer (non)compliance in Hoffman Plastic:
[I]t is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United
States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies.
Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts the
cornerstone of [the] IRCA's enforcement mechanism [i.e., the employment
verification system], or the employer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in
direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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avoidance of back pay and front pay liability under federal employment
discriminationlaw.
In addition to being clear in concept, that incentive is also significant in
substance. For example, suppose an employer is hiring for a $50,000 per
year position. That employer will likely choose to comply with its IRCA
employment verification system obligations, if it knows that:
(i)
compliance will translate to a $50,000 savings (one year combined back
pay plus front pay) or $100,000 savings (two years combined back pay plus
front pay) in any federal discrimination lawsuit brought by an
undocumented worker; and (ii) noncompliance will translate to $50,000 or
$100,000 in extra liability in any such lawsuit.
As a result, the
disqualifying condition feature encourages an employer's IRCA compliance
with a "carrot-and-stick" approach.
The "carrot" is the substantial
monetary savings in the form of foreclosed back pay and front pay liability.
Conversely, the "stick" is the significant additional monetary liability for
such damages. Regardless, both this "carrot" and "stick" act, respectively,
as the incentive for IRCA compliance and the deterrent against IRCA
noncompliance by employers.
As a final point, the disqualifying condition feature directly resolves a
primary criticism against foreclosure of any monetary remedies to
undocumented workers. For example, in his dissent in Hoffman Plastic,
Justice Breyer argued that denial of the NLRA's back pay remedy for
undocumented workers would compromise federal immigration policy by
creating a "perverse economic incentive" for employers to violate the
IRCA. 30 4 Explaining his view, Justice Breyer noted that such remedy
foreclosure (i) serves to "lower[] the cost to the employer" of an NLRA
violation, and (ii) thus creates, in that very employer, an "incentive to find
30 5
and to hire" these workers rather than legal workers.
The Conditional
Foreclosure Approach-via
its disqualifying
condition-eliminates any such "perverse economic incentive." As Justice
Breyer recognized, unconditional or automatic remedy foreclosure may, in
fact, create this "incentive" for employers to skirt the IRCA. 30 6 However,

304. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
305. Id.; see also id. at 156 (similarly stating that precluding the NLRA's back pay
remedy would "encourag[e these employers] to take risks, i.e., to hire with a wink and a nod
those potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment.., ultimately will lower the
costs of labor law violations"); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 912 (1984) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that employers would be encouraged to
hire undocumented alien employees once they realize "they may violate the NLRA with
respect to [those] employees without fear of having to recompense those workers for lost
back pay"); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (stating that "every remedy denied to undocumented workers provides a marginal
incentive for employers to hire those workers"); supra note 90 and accompanying text (fully
discussing this argument by Justice Brennan in his Sure-Tan opinion); supra note 144 and
accompanying text (fully discussing this argument by Justice Breyer in his Hoffman Plastic
dissent).
306. With "unconditional" or "automatic" remedy foreclosure, the only incentive for an
employer to comply with the IRCA would be avoidance of applicable civil and/or criminal
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the limited remedial foreclosure under this new approach is neither
unconditionalnor automatic-instead,by its very terms, it is "conditional"
upon the undocumented worker's fraudulent "employment process"
conduct, along with the employer's preceding compliance with its IRCA
obligations. Because the "carrot"--namely, limited monetary foreclosuresprings from such employer-based IRCA compliance, the Conditional
Foreclosure Approach removes the very "incentive to find and hire"
undocumented workers that Justice Breyer legitimately highlighted.
Thus, the disqualifying condition feature furthers the IRCA's purpose of
curtailing illegal immigration. This feature simultaneously creates not only
financial "reward" for employer IRCA compliance but also financial
"penalty" for noncompliance. Consequently, the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach furthers Congress's desired ends of reducing the "attractive
force" of the magnet of employment in30the
United States 30 7 and of closing
8
this "back door on illegal immigration."
C. Defending the "Limited Remedy Foreclosure" Feature
The second feature of the Conditional Foreclosure Approach is its limited
foreclosure of monetary remedies-namely, barring only back pay and front
pay (if the disqualifying condition is satisfied) yet preserving all other
monetary remedies, such as compensatory damages, punitive damages,
liquidated damages, and/or attorneys' fees.
This second feature is consistent with the "black letter" law and implicit
principles of the Supreme Court's NLRA precedent and also promotes, in a
sensible, balanced manner, the important policies of federal employment
discrimination law and federal immigration law.
1. The Supreme Court's NLRA Precedent-Explicit "Black Letter" Law
and Implicit Principles
The limited remedy foreclosure feature finds initial support in the explicit
"black letter" law of the Supreme Court's NLRA cases. In addition,
however, a close review of these cases (and other judicial authority) also
reveals the implicit principle that only back pay and front pay remediesexhibiting an "inherently work-based remedial characteristic"--are to be
foreclosed to undocumented workers under the federal employment
discrimination laws.
The definitive "black letter" law of the Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic
decisions provides that undocumented workers are foreclosed from the
remedies of back pay and reinstatement (for which front pay is the
penalties and sanctions for violation of the Act. However, because employers often view the
odds of being subject to an IRCA compliance audit as slim, the "specter" of such penalties or
sanctions may alone be inadequate incentive for such IRCA compliance.
307. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
308. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,

5650.
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monetary, equitable substitute). 30 9 For example, the Sure-Tan Court was
explicit as to the remedies that could be barred to undocumented workers.
Specifically, the Court stated that: (i) any reinstatement for such workers
would be unavailable absent their "legal reentry" and (ii) any back pay was
tolled, and unavailable, "during any period when they were not lawfully
entitled to be present and employed in the United States." 3 10 Consequently,
the Sure-Tan Court considered back pay and reinstatement (for which front
pay is the monetary equivalent and substitute) as generally unrecoverable
by undocumented workers.
The Hoffman Plastic Court was equally clear as to the remedial relief that
could be barred to undocumented workers. The Court stated in plain terms
that an "award[ of] backpay to an undocumented alien who has never been
legally authorized to work in the United States" is "foreclosed by federal
immigration policy [and the IRCA]." 3 11 Thus, like in Sure-Tan, the Court
in Hoffman Plastic generally placed the back pay remedy into the
"foreclosed" category for undocumented workers.
Consistent with this explicit "black letter" law of the Supreme Court's
NLRA cases, the limited remedy foreclosure feature serves to bar the
monetary remedies of back pay and front pay (as the equivalent and
substitute for the reinstatement remedy foreclosed by Sure-Tan).
Consequently, the specific subset of foreclosed remedies under these
decisions is the same subset of barred relief via this limited remedy
foreclosure feature.
Yet, this definitive "black letter" law from Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic
does not, and cannot, provide the complete and exclusive justification for
the limited remedy foreclosure feature. The reason is simple: these NLRA
decisions had no need to address, and thus did not address, possible
foreclosure of other monetary remedies (such as compensatory damages,
punitive damages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees) for
3 12
undocumented workers because they are unavailable under the NLRA.
Given that the Supreme Court was merely addressing the limited remedies
that were available under the NLRA, one cannot automatically assume that
(i) the remedies that it foreclosed are the only barred relief or (ii) the
remedies that it did not address remain available and recoverable as relief.
However, that very bifurcation-which represents the heart of the limited
remedy foreclosure feature-is supported by a subtle, but important,
principle embodied in Supreme Court (and other judicial) authority. This
principle is that monetary remedy foreclosure for undocumented workers is

309. See supra notes 158-60, 162 and accompanying text (discussing front pay and its
role as the monetary substitute for reinstatement).
310. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903; see also id. at 902-03 (similarly stating that "the
implementation of the [NLRB's] traditional remedies [i.e., reinstatement and back pay]...
must be conditioned upon the employees' legal readmittance to the United States" (emphasis
added)).
311. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).
312. See supra note 63 (discussing the remedies available under the NLRA).
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(i) appropriate as to relief that has an "inherently work-based remedial
characteristic" (i.e., it is naturally and inescapably linked or tied to wage
loss amounts that the worker could not have earned lawfully, due to his or
her "illegal" employment and work), but (ii) inappropriate as to relief that
does not have an "inherently work-based remedial characteristic."
The Supreme Court, in Hoffman Plastic, implicitly recognized this
principle.
Specifically, the Court observed that Castro's fraudulent,
employment-process conduct had "render[ed] an underlying employment
relationshipillegal under explicit provisions of [the IRCA]" 3 13 and that the
IRCA "expressly criminalize[d] the only employment relationship at issue
in this case." 3 14 Pointing to that "illegal" work by Castro, the Court flatly
rejected the NLRB's argument that would "allow it to award backpay to an
illegal alienfor. . . wages that could not lawfully have been earned,and for
a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud. '315 Thus, Hoffman
Plastic stands for more than its explicit "black letter" law of foreclosing the
monetary remedy of back pay. It represents the broader, implicit principle
that monetary remedies tied to "wages that could not lawfully have been
earned" 3 16 (i.e., having an "inherently work-based remedial characteristic")
3 17
are properly foreclosed.
Similarly, other judicial authority supports this principle. For example,
the four-judge dissent in Rivera, on the one hand, explained that
undocumented workers may not recover "back wages or wages they might
have earned in the future from . . . job[s] which they were incapable of
holding, under our Immigration laws." 3 18 Such "wage loss damages," said
the dissent, may not be awarded to "anyone who lacks the immigration
status or nationality to have a legal right to earn the wages claimed to have
'3 19

been lost."

On the other hand, the Rivera dissent reached the opposite conclusion as
to other Title VII monetary remedies for undocumented workers.
Specifically, it stated that courts may "still award remedies to vindicate
Title VII rights such as (1) emotional distress [compensatory] damages, (2)
punitive damages, and (3) attorneys' fees, all without "trenching upon " the

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
Id. at 151 n.5 (emphasis added).
Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
Id.
In his dissent in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Hoffman Plastic, Judge David B.

Sentelle also implicitly recognized this principle. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.

NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that "it defies
the logic of the [IRCA] that the employer could be compelled by law to pay to the illegal
[worker] unearned wages which he could not lawfully earn and to which he would have no

claim but for his prior successful fraud").
318. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
319. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
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IRCA policy of not allowing unauthorized aliens to... recover wage loss
' 320
damagesfor work time loss in jobs to which they had no legal right[s].
Like the Rivera dissent, the court in Renteria followed this same
principle of foreclosing only that monetary relief which exhibits this
"inherently work-based characteristic." While striking down the plaintiff's
"claims for back pay and front pay," 32 1 the court nonetheless concluded that
"[liquidated] damages for retaliatory termination under the FLSA remain
available to undocumented workers." 322 The court justified this remedial
differentiation by focusing upon whether the requested relief "assumed" an
undocumented worker's "illegal" work:
[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that awarding back pay to
undocumented aliens contravenes the policies embodied in [the IRCA].
An award of front pay would be inappropriate for the same reason: front
pay essentially assumes that the worker will continue to work for the
employer in the future, which is against the law for an undocumented
alien. We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding compensatory
damages.... The remedy of compensatory damages, unlike those of back
worker's continued
pay and front pay, does not assume the undocumented
323
(and illegal) employment by the employer.
The limited remedy foreclosure feature of the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach is wholly consistent with this implicit principle to foreclose an
undocumented worker's particular monetary remedy if it has an "inherently
work-based remedial characteristic." Specifically, this feature acts to bar
those monetary remedies that exhibit this characteristic (i.e., back pay and
front pay), while preserving those remedies that lack it (i.e., compensatory
damages, punitive damages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees).
As to back pay and front pay, both remedies are "inherently work-based"
in that each-in nature and computation-is inevitably linked to "workbased" sums that would have been earned by the undocumented worker via
"illegal" or "unlawful" employment. More specifically, these forms of
equitable, "make-whole" relief aim to "restor[e] victims . . . to the wage
and employment positions they would have occupied [at their place of
employment] absent the unlawful discrimination." 324 Further, back pay
merely computes "the difference between the amount the claimant would
have earned [in his or her position at the employer] absent the
discrimination and the amount of wages actually earned" prior to
judgment. 325 Similarly, the front pay remedy-acting as a "substitute for
reinstatement"-simply represents "lost compensation [from a plaintiffs

320. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
321. Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02-C-495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6 (N.D. I11.
Aug. 21, 2003).
322. Id.
323. Id. (emphasis added).
324. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992) (emphasis added); see supra Part
II.A (discussing the nature and purpose of back pay and front pay).
325. EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 744 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
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position at his or her employer] during the period between judgment and
'326
reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.
Thus, back pay and front pay relief exhibits this "inherently work-based
remedial characteristic." These remedies-whether in nature, purpose, or
computation-are inescapably wedded to undocumented workers' wage
losses: they must "assume" that worker's continued employment (in the
past and/or the future) and rely upon "work-based" compensation that
would have been earned (again, in the past or the future) by that worker.
For these reasons, the limited remedy foreclosure feature serves to properly
bar this relief to undocumented workers under the federal employment
discrimination laws.
As to the other monetary remedies, however, none of them-in nature or
purpose-exhibit this same "inherently work-based characteristic" that
inescapably links it to an undocumented worker's wage losses due to
"illegal" work. For example, compensatory damages (available under Title
VII and the ADA) represent significant-but non-"work-based"--monetary
losses caused by unlawful discrimination. Specifically, these damages
reflect "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary
losses." 327 So, compensatory damages are not connected to any "wage
losses" of the undocumented worker; instead, they are tied and linked only
to other "losses" (all non-wage-based or work-based) sustained by that
worker.
Punitive damages (also available under Title VII and the ADA) are, in
fact, not even tied to monetary loss (work-based or otherwise) of the victim
of discrimination. Instead, such damages, which are penal and corrective in
nature, are linked only to the severity or degree of employer misconductspecifically, whether the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice or
discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of [the] aggrieved individual. '328 Consequently,
such damages are wholly independent of the undocumented worker and his
or her wage loss or work-based amounts.
Similarly, liquidated damages (available under the ADEA) are "punitive
in nature" 329 for an employer's "willful violation[]" of the ADEA. 330 As a
result, like pure punitive damages under Title VII and the ADA, these
liquidated damages also are linked only to the severity or degree of
employer misconduct and are not intended to compensate for an

326. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001) (emphasis
added).
327. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000); see supra Part II.A (discussing the nature and

purpose of compensatory damages).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); see supra Part II.A (discussing the nature and purpose of

punitive damages).
329. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
330. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000); see supra Part II.A (discussing the nature and purpose of

liquidated damages).
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undocumented worker's wage loss amounts as to prior or future
employment or work. Uniquely, the ADEA's liquidated damages are
mathematically calculated by using an individual's lost pay or wagesspecifically, a prevailing ADEA plaintiff may recover liquidated damages
in an amount "equal" to "wages lost."' 33 ' However, this use of "wages lost"
as the formula for calculating liquidated damages does not convert the latter
into back-pay-type or front-pay-type relief. Instead, the substantive nature
andpurpose of this relief does not change-it is punitive in nature and tied
solely to an employer's "willful" misconduct.
Finally, recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees (and related costs and
expenses) is merely designed to (i) reimburse a prevailing plaintiff for
actual, out-of-pocket litigation and court costs and (ii) reimburse that
plaintiff, or otherwise compensate his or her attorney, for paid and/or
332
otherwise reasonably accrued legal services rendered in the litigation.
Consequently, such fees and costs have no relationship or link to an
undocumented worker's past or future wage loss sums.
Thus, neither compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidated
damages, nor attorneys' fees exhibit any "inherently work-based remedial
characteristic."
None of these remedies-in nature or purpose-is
inescapably tied to wage-based losses arising from assumed prior or future
"illegal work" of the undocumented worker. Indeed, each of these remedies
is inherently linked to something entirely distinct from "work-based"
losses: (i) non-wage-related, personal losses of an undocumented worker
(compensatory damages); (ii) severity or degree of unlawful discrimination
by the employer (punitive damages and liquidated damages); and (iii) nonwage-related legal expenses and fees of the worker and/or his or her legal
counsel (attorneys' fees). Consequently, the limited remedy foreclosure
feature properly acts to preserve such relief to undocumented workers under
the federal employment discrimination laws.
Notwithstanding the "black letter" law and implicit principles from the
Hoffman Plastic and Sure-Tan decisions, one could argue that such
Supreme Court precedent does not extend beyond NLRB-fashioned
331. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (stating that the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance with
the.., remedies.., provided" in section 216 of the FLSA); id. § 216(b) (listing applicable
FLSA remedies, including "the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages").
332. See generallyJordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 602 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating
that its "methodology" for determining "a reasonable attorney's fee award" includes (i) a
"starting point" calculation of "'the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate' (called the "'lodestar' amount), (ii) a subtraction
for "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours," and (iii) a final adjustment to
"reflect the 'result obtained' (which, in part, considers whether the plaintiffs success
"'makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis"' for the fee) (quoting Wayne v.
Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 531-32 (6th Cir. 1994))); Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224
F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (similarly stating that an award of attorneys' fees includes
(i) a calculation of "the 'lodestar' amount by "multiplying the number of hours the
prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate" and (ii)
subsequent adjustment for certain "additional considerations").
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remedies under the NLRA to judicially fashioned remedies under the
federal employment discrimination laws. For example, in Rivera, the Ninth
Circuit embraced this "NLRB-centric" view of Hoffman Plastic. Stating
that it "believe[d] it unlikely that [Hoffman Plastic] applies in Title VII
cases," 333 the court reasoned that Hoffman Plastic (i) merely addressed, and
limited, the NLRB's "remedial discretion to interpret statutes other than the
NLRA ' 334 and (ii) "sa[id] nothing regarding a federal court's power to
3 35
balance [the] IRCA against Title VI" when fashioning remedies.
Consequently, the Rivera court deemed a federal court to still retain "the
very authority to interpret both Title VII and [the] IRCA that the NLRB
lack[ed]" after Hoffman Plastic.336 Other commentators have similarly
argued for this NLRB-centric337(and NLRA-specific) interpretation and
application of Hoffman Plastic.
While it may be convenient to limit these NLRA cases to their NLRA
context, the NLRB-centric view rests upon a clear, but flawed, assumption.
This assumption is that Hoffman Plastic and Sure-Tan would have been
decided differently if a federal court (rather than a federal administrative
agency like the NLRB) had fashioned the at-issue remedial relief for
undocumented workers.
However, the Supreme Court's Sure-Tan decision flatly undercuts that
assumption. In that case, after the NLRB had originally awarded the
NLRA's "conventional remedy of reinstatement with backpay" for the
undocumented workers who had already returned to Mexico, 338 it was the
Seventh Circuit that proceeded to modify that remedial order by
enumerating a "minimum" six-month back pay remedy that the "employer
333. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
905 (2005); see also id. at 1066-67 (stating that it "seriously doubt[ed] that Hoffman is as
broadly applicable" so as to preclude "any award of backpay to an illegal immigrant" under
other federal statutes); id. at 1068 (viewing Hoffman Plastic as "not.. . relevant to a Title
VII action"); id. at 1069 (stating that "we seriously doubt that Hoffman applies in such [Title
VII] actions" so as to bar "the payment of back wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII
cases"); id. at 1074 n.19 (stating that "we have serious reservations about [Hoffman
Plastic's]applicability" in Title VII actions).
334. Id. at 1068.
335. Id. (also stating that it was "persuad[ed] ...that Hoffman does not resolve the
question whether federal courts may award backpay to undocumented workers who have
been discharged in violation of Title VII"); id. at 1074 (stating that "[wie seriously doubt
that Hoffman's prohibition of NLRB-authorized backpay awards under the NLRA serves to
prohibit a district court from awarding backpay to a Title VII plaintiff').
336. Id. at 1068.
337. See, e.g., Ho & Chang, supra note 20, at 499 (arguing that "Hoffman's holding is not
automatically transferable to other statutory contexts" and that "Hoffman's prohibition on
backpay does not apply in Title VII cases because of significant differences between its
enforcement scheme and that of the NLRA"); Megan A. Reynolds, Comment, ImmigrationRelated Discovery After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: ExaminingDefending
Employers' Knowledge ofPlaintiffs' Immigration Status, 2005 MICH.ST. L. REv. 1261, 1287
(arguing that "[c]ourts should reject the application of Hoffman to federal protective statutes
other than the NLRA because Hoffman relied on particular features of the NLRA and on the
limited authority of the NLRB").
338. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1187-88 (1978).
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must pay [to each undocumented worker] in any event. '339 Thus, when
deciding Sure-Tan, the Supreme Court was not only dealing with remedial
relief fashioned by the NLRB (a federal administrative agency) but also
such relief-via a modified remedial order-fashioned by an actualfederal
circuit court.
In its decision, the Court expressly recognized that the source of the
challenged remedial relief went beyond the NLRB to the Seventh Circuit.
For example, the Court initially noted that it was addressing legal
"challenges" to "the Court of Appeals' order which modified the Board's
original order by providing for an irreducible minimum of six months'
backpay for each employee." 340 Similarly, the Sure-Tan Court stated that
"the Court of Appeals impermissibly expanded the Board's original order"
and that the "remedy ordered by the Court of Appeals exceeds the limits
imposed by the NLRA. ' '34 1 Moreover, the Court noted that the "probable
unavailability of the [NLRA's] more effective remedies in light of the
practical workings of the immigration laws . . . simply cannot justify the
judicial arrogationof remedial authority not fairly encompassedwithin the
34 2
Act."
Thus, while the NLRB-centric view assumes that a federal court could
have properly fashioned the remedial relief at issue in the Supreme Court's
NLRA cases, the distinctive procedural posture and "black letter" law of
Sure-Tan show just the opposite. That procedural posture unquestionably
involved a federal court (namely, a federal circuit court) that had ordered
certain back pay relief for undocumented workers; and, that "black letter"
law clearly labeled a federal court's remedial order as improper under
federal immigration law and the NLRA.
As a result, the NLRB-centric view-and its underlying assumptionlook at the Supreme Court's NLRA cases through too narrow a prism. As
nicely recognized by the Rivera dissent and as illustrated by the Sure-Tan
decision, these cases address "the question [of] . . . not who can vindicate
the rights [of undocumented workers], but what damages can be recovered"
by them.343 The NLRB-centric view, by focusing only on the "who orders
the remedial relief' issue, neglects the broader issue in those cases-

339. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 606 (7th Cir. 1982), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
340. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898 (1984) (emphasis added); see also id. at
886 (addressing "the validity of the Board's remedial order as modified by the Court of
Appeals" (emphasis added)).
341. Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
342. Id. at 904 (emphasis added); see also id. at 904 n. 13 (stating that "we remain bound
to respect the directives of the INA... and to guard against judicial distortion of the

statutory limits placed by Congress on the Board's remedial authority" (emphasis added)).
343. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 835 ("More fundamentally, why should a district court have any greater discretion
to fashion remedies for civil rights violations which 'trench upon federal statutes and
policies' unrelated to Title VII (such as prohibitions on unauthorized aliens working in the
U.S.) than does the NLRB?").
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namely, that of "what remedial relief is (in)appropriate for undocumented
workers." The Supreme Court did not decide its NLRA cases because of
the "who" issue-it decided them because of the "what" issue. When
viewed through the proper prism of "what remedial relief is (in)appropriate
for undocumented workers," the Supreme Court's NLRA precedent
provides firm support for the limited remedy foreclosure feature of the
Conditional Foreclosure Approach.
2. Promoting and Balancing Federal Employment Discrimination Policy
and Federal Immigration Policy
In addition, the limited remedy foreclosure feature of the Conditional
Foreclosure Approach properly balances and promotes the policies of both
federal employment discrimination law and federal immigration law. While
other remedial approaches "elevate" problematically one policy or the other
to a "superior" or "untouchable" status, this new approach opts for policy
equality over policy superiority.
First, the limited remedy foreclosure feature maintains and promotes
federal employment discrimination policy by preserving substantial
monetary remedies (e.g., compensatory damages, punitive damages,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees) and the critical deterrent and
punitive purposes they serve. For example, when Congress added
compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII and ADA remedies in
1991, the expressly stated purposes of these additional, potentially lucrative
remedies included: (i) further "encourag[ing] citizens to act as private
attorneys general to enforce" their Title VII rights; 344 and (ii) further
"deter[ring] unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace." 345 According to Congress, these compensatory and punitive
damages achieve this deterrent purpose by "rais[ing] the cost of an
employer's engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby providing
employers with additional incentives to prevent intentional discrimination
in the workplace before it happens." 346 Similarly, when fashioning the
monetary remedies under the ADEA, Congress intended liquidated

344. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 65 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603;
see also id. at 70 (finding that "permitting the recovery of such damages would enhance the
effectiveness of Title VII by... encouraging private enforcement").
345. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991); see
also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.1, at 14, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 552 (noting that

one of the purposes of the 1991 Act was to "provide monetary remedies for victims of
intentional employment discrimination... to provide more effective deterrence" (emphasis
added)); id. at 70 (finding that "permitting the recovery of such damages would enhance the
effectiveness of Title VII by ... deterring future acts of discrimination"); id., pt. 2, at 1

(noting that the 1991 Act was intended to "strengthen existing protections and remedies
available under federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence").
346. Id. pt. 1, at 65; see also id. at 69 (stating that "[m]aking employers liable for all
losses-economic and otherwise-which are incurred as a consequence of prohibited
discrimination ... will serve as a necessary deterrent to future acts of discrimination, both
for those held liable for damages as well as the employer community as a whole").
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damages-which are "punitive in nature"-to
serve "as 'an effective
347
deterrent to willful violations of the ADEA.'
The limited remedy foreclosure feature simultaneously protects and
promotes each important purpose served by those remedies. Ultimately,
Congress viewed compensatory damages, punitive damages, and liquidated
damages as the "carrot-and-stick" means by which employment
discrimination could be reduced and prevented on a national level. 348 By
preserving all of these significant monetary remedies as the "carrot" for
undocumented workers, the Conditional Foreclosure Approach will provide
these workers-as Congress had generally envisioned-with substantial
monetary incentive "to act as private attorneys general" and thus pursue
applicable claims against discriminatory employers. 349 Similarly, by
leaving untouched such substantial monetary liabilities as the "stick" for
employers, the limited remedy foreclosure feature also gives employers-as
Congress had also envisioned--"additional incentives to prevent intentional
'350
discrimination in the workplace before it happens.
In fact, this new approach's significant promotion and protection of
federal employment discrimination policy becomes especially apparent
when comparing its preserved monetary remedies to the NLRA relief still
available to undocumented workers after Hoffman Plastic. Despite
foreclosing the back remedy to these workers under the NLRA, the
Hoffman Plastic Court viewed the Act's "other significant sanctions"which included the nonmonetary relief of cease-and-desist orders, the
obligation to post work notices regarding unlawful conduct, and possible
"contempt proceedings"-as "sufficient to effectuate national labor
policy." 35 1 Thus, by preserving actual monetary remedies under the federal
employment discrimination laws that are far more substantial than these
"other significant sanctions" under the NLRA, the limited remedy
foreclosure feature extends far beyond being merely "sufficient to
effectuate" federal employment discrimination policy.
Next, the limited remedy foreclosure feature also maintains and promotes
federal immigration policy by creating at least some negative, remedial
consequences for undocumented workers who engage in IRCA-prohibited

347. Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985)).
348. See infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes served by

compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII and the ADA), 188-89 and
accompanying text (discussing the purpose served by liquidated damages under the ADEA).
349. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603.

350. Id. (emphasis added).
351. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002); see also

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n.13 (1984) (similarly noting that, even absent
back pay relief, other "traditional remedies" under the NLRA-such as cease and desist
orders and any applicable, subsequent contempt proceedings-still applied and provided "a
significant deterrent against future violations" of the NLRA).
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fraudulent conduct in the employment and hiring processes. 352 As
discussed above, when passing the IRCA, Congress made "combating the
employment of illegal aliens central to '[t]he policy of immigration
law."' 353 Viewing "employment" as the "back door on illegal immigration"
and "the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally," 354 Congress intended the
IRCA to serve as "[t]he principal means of closing the back door" 355 and
356
"diminish[ing] the attractive force" of that magnet.
By barring the monetary remedies of back pay and front pay to
undocumented workers, the limited remedy foreclosure feature provides a
tangible, monetary disincentive against those workers entering the United
States in the first place for employment purposes. 357 Admittedly, the
prospect of not recovering back pay and front pay remedies in the event of a
potential federal employment discrimination claim against an employer in
the United States could, depending on the undocumented worker, (i) be too
remote or slight to alter that worker's financial-driven decision to enter the
United States for employment, or (ii) be a concrete factor in that worker's
decision-making calculus. The real point, though, is that the limited
foreclosure feature does not ignore the IRCA and federal immigration
policy. Instead, it does its part-whether small, medium, or large-to help
"diminish the attractive force" of the employment magnet, "clos[e] the back
door" of illegal immigration, and "combat[] employment" of undocumented
workers.
Thus, the limited remedy foreclosure feature of the Conditional
Foreclosure Approach views both federal employment discrimination
policy and federal immigration policy as important "equals." Taking this
"policy equality" view, this feature promotes and balances both sets of
important federal policy and refuses to elevate one set into a "superior" or
"untouchable" position at the expense of the other set.
Advocates for the first or third remedial approaches could argue that the
limited remedy foreclosure feature-by relying upon "policy equality" to
achieve a compromising "middle ground"-fails to fully embrace and
352. As discussed in Part III.B.3, supra, the first feature of the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach-its disqualifying condition-promotes the important policies of the IRCA from
the employer's perspective: it provides a monetary "carrot" for IRCA compliance and a
monetary "stick" for IRCA violation. In contrast, the limited foreclosure feature promotes
federal immigration policy from the undocumented worker's perspective: it provides a
monetary disincentive for initial, unlawful entry into the United States.
353. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 147 (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights,
Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8 (1991)).
354. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,

5650.
355. Id. (also noting that "the Committee remains convinced that legislation containing
employer sanctions is the most ...effective way to respond to the large-scale influx of
undocumented aliens").
356. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
357. See, e.g., Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (stating that "every remedy extended to undocumented workers under the federal
labor laws provides a marginal incentive for those workers to come to the United States").
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promote federal employment discrimination policy or federal immigration
policy, respectively. In other words, as the argument would go, this new
remedial approach: (i) does not fully promote, and at least partially
compromises, federal employment discrimination policy because it bars at
least some monetary remedies for undocumented workers; and (ii) does not
fully promote, and at least partially compromises, federal immigration
policy because it allows at least some monetary remedies for those workers.
While the first remedial approach may "fully promote" federal
employment discrimination policy (by preserving all monetary remedies)
and the third remedial approach may "fully promote" federal immigration
policy (by barring all such remedies), each approach is able to achieve its
respective result only by employing the flawed philosophy of "policy
superiority." This philosophy elevates one competing federal policy to a
"superior" position and thus relegates the other competing federal policy to
an "inferior" status.
Embracing a "policy superiority" philosophy, the first remedial approach
automatically elevates federal employment discrimination policy over, and
to the exclusion of, federal immigration policy. In Rivera, the Ninth Circuit
did not seek a true balance of the deterrent and punitive policies of federal
employment discrimination law and federal immigration law. Instead, the
Rivera court considered Title VII to embody a "national policy of the
highest priority 358 and then observed that "the overriding national policy
against discrimination" would "outweigh" any IRCA-supported bar to back
pay remedies for undocumented workers. 359 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit placed federal employment discrimination policy in a superior and
"untouchable" position, whereby any action that may negatively impact that
policy (i.e., judicial foreclosure of any monetary remedies to undocumented
workers) is automatically rendered invalid.
Also reflecting a "policy superiority" philosophy, the third remedial
approach automatically elevates federal immigration policy over, and to the
exclusion of, federal employment discrimination policy. In Egbuna, the
Fourth Circuit similarly did no true balancing of federal immigration policy
and federal employment discrimination policy. Instead, the Egbuna court
exclusively focused on the IRCA and its underlying policy and then
concluded that any remedial relief for undocumented workers under the
federal employment discrimination laws would (i) "sanction the formation
of a statutorily declared illegal relationship" and (ii) "nullify [the] IRCA,
which declares it illegal to hire or to continue to employ unauthorized
aliens." 360 Thus, the Fourth Circuit placed federal immigration policy in a
superior and "untouchable" position, whereby any action that may
negatively impact that policy (i.e., judicial preservation of any monetary

358. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
359. Id. at 1069 (emphasis added).
360. Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1998).
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remedies for undocumented workers) is automatically rendered
unacceptable.
Either approach's philosophy of "policy superiority"-whether elevating
federal employment discrimination policy or federal immigration policynot only lacks supporting precedent but also leads to substantial
compromise of the "trumped" federal policy. As to the former approach,
the Rivera dissent observantly recognized that "[t]here is nothing in either
the Hoffman opinion or caselaw to suggest that the policy concerns
underlying Title VII trump the policy considerations of the IRCA. '' 36 1 The
converse would presumably be true as well-namely, no such basis exists
to suggest that the IRCA's "policy concerns" would "trump" the policies of
federal employment discrimination law.
In addition, the "policy superiority" philosophy also serves to ignore
completely the "inferior" or "trumped" federal policy. For example, the
first remedial approach-in preserving all monetary remedies for
undocumented workers in an effort to "fully promote" federal employment
discrimination policy-substantially frustrates the key federal policy of
curtailing illegal immigration. Specifically, because this approach refuses
to bestow any tangible or negative remedial consequence upon such
workers, it quite simply fails to do its part (or to play any positive role) in
helping to "diminish the attractive force" of the employment magnet,
"clos[e] the back door" of illegal immigration, and/or "combat[]
employment" of undocumented workers. In fact, under the first remedial
approach, federal immigration policy might as well not even exist-it gives
that policy no weight or importance, and it makes no effort to discourage
the illegal immigration that Congress has expressly aimed to curtail.
Similarly, the third remedial approach-in foreclosing all monetary
remedies for undocumented workers in an effort to "fully promote" federal
immigration policy-significantly compromises important deterrent and
punitive purposes that are served by those remedies under federal
employment discrimination law. Specifically, this approach, (i) fails to
provide any monetary "carrot" for undocumented workers "to act as private
attorneys general" under those laws, and (ii) eliminates all possible
monetary "sticks" that serve as "additional incentives [for employers] to
prevent intentional discrimination in the workplace before it happens."
Thus, under the third remedial approach, federal employment
discrimination policy might as well not even exist-it encourages
undocumented workers to remain silent in the face of employment
discrimination, and it opens the door for employers to discriminate without
362
financial consequence.
361. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., dissenting)
(similarly noting that the Rivera court "cite[d] no authority whatsoever for the proposition
that the national policy against discrimination outweighs immigration policy").
362. The third remedial approach is also problematic because it relegates an
undocumented worker to a position that is no better or different than that of a person who is
not even classified as an "employee" under the federal employment discrimination laws.
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In sum, the "means" of the first and third remedial approaches simply do
not justify their "ends" of "fully promoting" their respective federal
policies. In order to achieve this end, each approach embraces a "policy

superiority" view that acts to sacrifice completely the other, competing
federal policy. The limited remedy foreclosure feature does not place any
federal policy in "superior" or "inferior" (or "untouchable" or "touchable")
categories. Instead, it embodies a "policy equality" philosophy that views
the monetary remedial rights of undocumented workers through two equal
lenses. As a result, the Conditional Foreclosure Approach achieves an

This approach affords such workers "rights" under such laws, but extends no "remedies" for
violation of those rights. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 911-12 (1984)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "disturbing anomaly"
created when undocumented workers are deemed "employees" under the NLRA and
"entitled to all of the protections that come with that status" but then "stripped of the normal
remedial protections of the Act"). Thus, the practical consequence of the third remedial
approach is to equate undocumented workers with noncovered "employees"--there is zero
remedial recovery for both groups, zero liability for employers who discriminate against
both groups, and no practical protection from unlawful workplace discrimination for both
groups.
Relegating undocumented workers to this practical status of non-"employees" runs
counter to the Supreme Court's Sure-Tan decision and the legislative history of the IRCA,
both of which indicate that undocumented workers are, in fact, covered "employees" for
purposes of the NLRA. First, in its Sure-Tan decision in 1984, the Court tackled the
"predicate question [of] whether the NLRA should apply to unfair labor practices committed
against undocumented aliens." Id. at 891. The Court expressly held that "the provisions of
the NLRA are applicable to undocumented alien employees." Id. at 894.
Similarly, when enacting the IRCA two years later in 1986, Congress approved this
position of the Sure-Tan Court. Specifically, it stated that the IRCA was not intended to
"undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law" as to undocumented
workers or to "limit in any way the scope of the term 'employee' under the NLRA. H.R.
REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662; see also
Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
House's committee report "endorses the first holding of Sure-Tan, that undocumented aliens
are employees within the meaning of the NLRA").
While the Sure-Tan Court and Congress addressed this issue in the context of the
NLRA, courts have similarly concluded that undocumented workers are covered
"employees" for purposes of the federal employment discrimination laws. See, e.g., Rivera,
384 F.3d at 832 n.14 (Bea, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "unauthorized aliens are entitled
to the protections of Title VII"); Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064 n.4 (stating that "we have long
assumed to be the law of this circuit" that "Title VII applies to discrimination against
undocumented aliens on one of the protected grounds"); Egbuna, 153 F.3d at 189-90 (Ervin,
J., dissenting) (stating that any classification of undocumented workers as noncovered
"employees" would be "at-odds" with "every court that has considered [the] IRCA's effect
on federal labor laws"); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the court "will assume without deciding that the undocumented workers in this
case were entitled to the protections of Title VII" and noting the persuasive argument "by
analogy to case law interpreting the NLRA that undocumented aliens fall within the broad
category of 'individual[s]' protected by Title VII"), abrogated on other grounds by
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998); EEOC v. Rest. Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007)
(stating that "[e]very court that has considered the impact of Hoffman Plastic on Title VII
either assumed or concluded that undocumented workers have standing in their own right to
obtain relief," and concluding that the plaintiff "has standing to pursue her federal civil
rights claims" under Title VII).
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effective "middle ground" and balance between the policies
of federal
363
employment discrimination law and federal immigration law.
363. While this Article has proposed and discussed the Conditional Foreclosure Approach
in the context of employment discrimination and/or retaliation claims brought by
undocumented workers under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, this new approach would
presumably be equally applicable to other federal employment-related laws that offer
comparable claims and monetary remedies.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2000), would be one such example. The FMLA, which creates certain work-leave-related
rights for an "eligible employee," id. § 2612(a)(l)-(2), prohibits any employer interference
with, restraint, or denial of these leave rights, id. § 2615(a)(1). It also contains an
antiretaliation provision similar to those of Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. See id. §
2615(a)(2); supra notes 3-5 (describing Title VII's, the ADA's, and the ADEA's
antiretaliation provisions, respectively). If an employer violates any of these FMLA
provisions, the prevailing plaintiff may recover the following monetary remedies: (i) "any
wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost.., by reason of
the violation" (i.e., back pay and/or front pay); (ii) if no actual lost pay under (i), a substitute
amount for "actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the
violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to 12 weeks of wages or
salary for the employee"; (iii) additional "liquidated damages" in the same amount as the lost
pay or substitute amount; and (iv) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Id. § 2617(a)(1),
(a)(3).
These claims under the FMLA are quite comparable-if not identical, in the case of
retaliation-to those under the federal employment discrimination laws. The same is also
true for its remedial scheme, which is very similar to that of the ADEA in light of its use of
"liquidated damages." If the Conditional Foreclosure Approach were applied to such claims
by an undocumented worker under the FMLA, it would have the following remedial effect:
(i) if the disqualifying condition were satisfied due to the undocumented worker's use of
IRCA-prohibited fraudulent means to obtain employment, that worker would be foreclosed
from back pay and front pay but not from any of the other FMLA remedies; and (ii) if the
disqualifying condition were not satisfied, he or she would not be foreclosed from any of
these FMLA monetary remedies whatsoever.
In addition, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), provides a comparable
retaliation claim and comparable monetary remedies for that claim. See supra notes 181-84
and accompanying text (discussing the FLSA's antiretaliation provision and the available
monetary remedies for an FLSA retaliation claim-namely, "payment of wages lost," "an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages," and a "reasonable attorney's fee" and
costs); supra notes 229-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Renteria court's decision
regarding the undocumented worker-plaintiff's FLSA retaliation claim and the available
remedies for that claim). If the Conditional Foreclosure Approach were applied to a
retaliation claim by an undocumented worker under the FLSA, it would have the following
remedial effect: (i) if the disqualifying condition were satisfied, that worker would be
foreclosed from "payment of wages lost" (i.e., back pay and front pay) but not from any of
the other FLSA remedies; and (ii) if the disqualifying condition were not satisfied, he or she
would not be foreclosed from any of these FLSA monetary remedies whatsoever.
While this new approach would be applicable to FLSA retaliation claims, it would
not be applicable to FLSA claims for unpaid overtime amounts or minimum wage sums that
are tied to work that has already been performed. Because these claims involve monetary
remedies for work already completed, they are not comparable to discrimination or
retaliation-type claims, which do not involve such remedies. Courts have resoundingly
agreed that undocumented workers are not foreclosed from overtime or minimum wage
compensation for work actually and already performed. See, e.g., Chellen v. John Pickle Co.,
446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277-78 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (concluding that "Hoffman does not
preclude an [FLSA] award for work actually performed" by undocumented workers and also
noting that "[c]ourts in several jurisdictions have found that Hoffman does not limit [FLSA]
backpay for work already performed" (citations omitted)); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
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CONCLUSION

Today, there is no uniform judicial approach for determining the
monetary remedial rights of the millions of undocumented workers under
the federal employment discrimination laws. The three existing remedial
approaches span the spectrum in terms of remedial impact. At one end of
the spectrum is an approach that preserves all monetary remedies and
forecloses none. In the middle is an approach that preserves some, and
forecloses some, of these remedies. At the other end of the spectrum is an
approach that preserves none of these remedies and forecloses all.
Consequently, this Article proposes the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach as the uniform remedial approach for ascertaining the remedial
rights of undocumented workers who pursue discrimination and/or
retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADA, and/or the ADEA. This new
approach-with its two distinct features of a disqualifying condition and
limited remedy foreclosure-represents a balanced, "middle ground"
approach that draws from the many relevant sources on this issue: (i) the
IRCA and its congressional philosophy and legislative history; (ii) the
Supreme Court's Hoffman Plastic and Sure-Tan decisions under the NLRA;
(iii) federal employment discrimination policy and purpose; and (iv) federal
immigration policy and purpose. This approach properly promotes both
federal employment discrimination policy and federal immigration policy
(without sacrificing either) and adequately holds accountable both
employers and undocumented workers for unlawful conduct under the
IRCA and/or federal employment discrimination law.
The time has come to bring reason and order to this chaotic area. By best
achieving the dual policy goals behind immigration law and employment
discrimination law in the United States, the Conditional Foreclosure
Approach provides the most effective blueprint for dealing with federal
employment discrimination claims by undocumented workers.

393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 321-25 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding that undocumented workers are not
barred from obtaining monetary relief as part of their FLSA claims for unpaid overtime or
minimum wage amounts for "work already performed"); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d
462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL
1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (same).
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